The peace treaties concluded in Paris basically completed the process of forming the post-war borders in Europe, although they did not ensure the complete and proper registration of all territorial delimitations. One part of the changes was negotiated, the other was based only on general wartime agreements.
Post-war territorial problems can be divided into three unequal groups: 1) issues related to the establishment of new borders in eastern Europe, 2) the problem of border delimitation of Germany and Italy with their western neighbors, 3) "frozen" (¦) territorial and ethnic conflicts and disputes, not received permission during the post-war settlement.
Changes in borders in eastern Europe were associated with the greatest political complications. According to the 1947 peace treaty with Finland, the Petsamo (Pechenga) region remained for the Soviet Union, which the USSR acquired after the Soviet-Finnish war of 1940. The possession of this territory provided the Soviet Union with access to the border with Norway, new harbors on the Barents Sea, as well as possessions large nickel deposits near the new Soviet-Norwegian border. The line of the Soviet-Finnish border was preserved in Leningrad region, changed in 1940 in such a way that the Vyborg region ceded to the USSR. Finland leased the territory of Portkalla-Udd to the Soviet Union at a strategically important point on the Finnish coast of the Baltic Sea at the entrance to The Gulf of Finland for the construction of a Soviet naval base there. The Aland Islands belonging to Finland acquired the status of a demilitarized zone.
The territory of the former German East Prussia, as already mentioned in Ch. 1, was divided between Poland and the USSR. She went to the Soviet Union Eastern, including the city of Konigsberg with the adjacent zone (present-day Kaliningrad and the Kaliningrad region) and the city of Memel with the surrounding districts (Klaipeda region). After renaming, Konigsberg was included in the RSFSR, and Memel (Klaipeda) - in the Lithuanian SSR (now the Republic of Lithuania). The western part of East Prussia, the city of Danzig (present-day Gdansk) with the adjacent territories and the lands of the former "Polish corridor" (Mazovia) entered Poland. These changes have not received contractual registration.
The Soviet-Polish border was pushed westward from the pre-war border and drawn along the "Curzon Line" in such a way that Western Belarus and Western Ukraine and Lvov remained in the USSR. The former Vilnius region (Vilnius), which was included in the Lithuanian SSR, also remained within the USSR. These changes were formalized by the Treaty on the Soviet-Polish state border of August 1945.
The Polish-German border was also pushed to the west and drawn along the Oder-West Neisse rivers. Poland included Pomerania with the city of Stettin (present-day Szczecin) and Silesia with the city of Breslau (present-day Wroclaw). The acquisitions of Poland in the west at the expense of Germany compensated for the losses from the loss of the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine. Unlike pre-war multinational Poland, the new Poland became a mono-ethnic state. Contractual registration western border Poland did not receive it. In 1950, an agreement was signed between Poland and the German Democratic Republic (created in September 1949 on the territory of the eastern occupation sectors of Germany, see below) in the Polish city of Zgorzelec on the demarcation of the "border of peace and friendship" along the Oder-West Neisse line ... The Western powers and West Germany did not recognize its legality. (¦)
Controversy was caused by the issue of Cieszyn Silesia, over which Poland and Czechoslovakia fought in 1920. At the time of the destruction of Czechoslovakia in 1938, this territory was incorporated into Poland. But after World War II, when the rights of Czechoslovakia were restored, the Czechoslovak government demanded the return of Cieszyn Silesia. In response, the Polish leadership proposed to be guided by the principle of ethnic demarcation in the settlement of the dispute, as was done in relations between Poland and the USSR. If the Polish population in the disputed territory turned out to be larger than the Czech population, Poland would have the right to keep it for itself. But Prague firmly insisted on the illegality of all "Munich borders" and pointed out that the question of Cieszyn Silesia had already been resolved by legal means as a result of the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement of 1920, as a result of which we can only talk about the restoration of the Polish-Czechoslovak border on its basis. The USSR supported Czechoslovakia. The issue was settled on a bilateral basis through the signing of a separate Polish-Czechoslovak agreement. Cieszyn Silesia remained part of Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovakia also received back the Sudetenland taken from it in 1938 under the Munich agreements. This change was not formalized by any contract. At the same time, Czechoslovakia transferred the Transcarpathian Ukraine to the USSR, which until 1938 was part of Czechoslovakia, then briefly belonged to puppet Slovakia, and was taken from that by the decisions of the first Vienna arbitration in 1938 by Hungary. After World War II, the rights of Czechoslovakia in Transcarpathia were restored, but she transferred them to the Soviet Union. The corresponding Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was signed on June 29, 1945. This region was included in the Ukrainian SSR.
The 1947 peace treaty with Romania confirmed the USSR's rights to possession of Northern Bukovina (Chernivtsi), transferred to the Soviet Union by Romania in 1940, as well as Bessarabia, returned to it at the same time. Northern Bukovina became part of the Ukrainian SSR, Bessarabia became a separate union republic- The Moldavian SSR (modern Republic of Moldova), to which the former Moldavian ASSR was annexed (back in 1940) as part of the Soviet Ukraine. Thus, the Ukrainian SSR transferred part of its territory to the Moldavian SSR, in exchange for which it received southern regions Bessarabia with access to the Black Sea and the mouth of the Danube.
In connection with border issues, it was necessary to decide on the Vienna arbitrations of 1938 and 1940. These arbitrations were essentially the arbitration courts of Germany and Italy in territorial disputes between Hungary and its neighbors. France and Britain then declared their neutral attitude to what is happening in the Danube Basin. The first arbitration, as mentioned above, took place on November 2, 1938 at the insistence of Hungary, which was headed by M. Horthy. The events took place shortly after the liquidation of Che- (¦) Choslovakia and the emergence of puppet Slovakia on the political map of the region. Hungary insisted on the transfer of the lands of former Czechoslovakia with the Hungarian population living on them, which had been transferred to Slovakia, including the territory of Transcarpathia (Transcarpathian Ukraine) and southern Slovakia. According to the decisions of the arbitration, these areas were transferred from Slovakia to Hungary.
According to the second Vienna arbitration, on August 30, 1940, Hungary obtained from Romania the transfer of Northern Transylvania to it (Transylvania passed to Romania under the Trianon Treaty of 1920), where a large Hungarian minority also lived. In the peace treaties with Germany's allies in 1947, the decisions of the Vienna arbitration were canceled. Romania retained all of Transylvania with the city of Brasov and the Eastern Banat with the city of Temisoara, where there was also a significant Hungarian population.
At the same time, Romania itself in 1947 had to agree with the belonging of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria, which it received bloodlessly with the support of Germany and Italy (as well as the USSR) from Romania under the Treaty of Craiova dated September 8, 1940. The territory of Southern Dobrudja at the beginning of XX v. belonged to the Ottoman Porte, but was lost to it during the First Balkan War (October 9, 1912 - May 3, 1913), in which Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro fought against the Ottoman Empire. According to the London Peace Treaty, she became part of Bulgaria. But during the Second Balkan War (June 29 - August 10, 1913), when Bulgaria attacked its former allies - Greece, Serbia and Montenegro - those with the support of Romania and Ports that joined the war defeated Bulgaria. According to the Bucharest Peace, Bulgaria lost almost all of its acquisitions from the First Balkan War and, in particular, was forced to cede Southern Dobruja to Romania. Disputes between Sofia and Bucharest over this territory in 1940 and 1947. thus, were rooted in the events of the Balkan wars due to the division of the "European heritage of Turkey". On the whole, the territorial decisions of 1947 were extremely favorable for Bulgaria, which - the only one of Germany's allies - not only did not lose any of its lands, but even retained what it had taken from Romania in 1940. southern part Dobrudzhi.
Hungary suffered in the course of the settlement more than all of Germany's allies. Its borders were restored as of January 1, 1938, that is, at the time before the Vienna arbitrations. Hungary could not keep the Vojvodina lands taken back from Yugoslavia in 1941 (the combined name of the region, which included the historical regions of Backa and Western Banat), where the Hungarian minority lived, and finally lost hope of regaining at least part of Transylvania from Hungarian population. In addition, she was forced to cede a small part of the territory to Czechoslovakia in the area of Bratislava on the opposite side of the Danube. (¦)
Yugoslavia ended up after the 1945-1954 negotiations. received from Italy the Istrian peninsula, the commune of Zara with the adjacent islands, Fiume, the Pelagoza island in the Adriatic Sea with the adjacent islands, as well as the main part of the Julian Caribbean with the exception of Trieste. Belgrade again (after the Versailles settlement) achieved the transfer of the entire Vojvodina to it (see above), as well as Kosovo. Yugoslavia was able to keep the northern parts of historical Macedonia and united the lands of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina into a single Yugoslav state under the rule of J.B. Tito.
It was a kind of national revival of the country, carried out under the flag of communism and internationalism. The borders of the Yugoslav republics were formed in such a way that lands with a predominance of the Serb population - Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem - were transferred to Croatia. None of them received the rights of autonomy within Croatia. She also got Dalmatia - an area of the Adriatic coast, whose population was made up of Serbs, Muslims and Croats. Although this region had an autonomous status even during the years of being a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, being included in Croatia, it lost its autonomy rights. On the other hand, two autonomous regions were created inside Serbia - Vojvodina with a predominance of the Hungarian population and Kosovo with a predominance of the Albanian population. As a Croat, J.B. Tito sought to weaken Serbia, fearing Serbian nationalism and not trusting the Serbian leaders.
The Dodecanese Islands (Southern Sporades) in the Aegean Sea were transferred to Greece under the 1947 peace treaty with Italy. But she received neither parts of the Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia, nor the Northern Epirus, which remained behind Albania.
Border changes in western Europe were not so dramatic. The border between France and Germany was restored in its pre-war form. At the same time, France at the end of 1946 unilaterally separated the Saar region from Germany, which she began to consider as an autonomous entity in relation to Germany. The actions of Paris were sanctioned by the Western allies "retroactively" - only in 1948 at the London meeting of the six powers on Germany (February 23 - March 6 and April 20 - June 1, 1948, Great Britain, France, the United States and the Benelux countries). France retained its control over the Saar until 1958, after which, following a referendum, the Saar region was again included in Germany.
Some changes in favor of France were made in accordance with the 1947 peace treaty with Italy on four sections of the Franco-Italian border - the Lesser Saint Bernard pass, the Mont Cenis plateau and Moi Tabor-Chaberton, as well as in the upper reaches of the Tinet, Vesubia and Roya rivers. (¦)
Finally, by the decision of the aforementioned London meeting of the six powers in 1948, small territorial changes were made to the borders of Germany with Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. Holland received areas of the cities of Bantheim, Venlo, Borkum and the Dollart Bay at the mouth of the Ems River. Belgium - the district of Monhau and part of the Schleiden district. Luxembourg is an eight kilometers wide strip along the Moselle River.
At the same time, at least three blocks of problems were not resolved during the settlement of the 40s and became sources of interstate friction in the future. First, the dispute over the historical region of Macedonia continued to "smolder" - it became noticeably aggravated in the 90s. The main part of this area, which until 1912 remained part of the Ottoman Empire, was annexed to Bulgaria during the First Balkan War. Serbia and Montenegro also received large gains in that war, and their territories almost doubled. But in the camp of the victors, a conflict arose, which resulted in the Second Balkan War, started by Bulgaria against its neighbors. Since the hostilities turned out to be unfavorable for Bulgaria, in 1913, according to the Peace of Bucharest, she lost the northern part of Macedonia, which went to Serbia and its southern part, which passed to Greece. Since then, historical Macedonia has been divided between Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece into Serbian (Vardar, along the Vardar river) Macedonia, Greek (Aegean) Macedonia and Bulgarian (Pirin, by the name of the Pirin mountain range) Macedonia. After the German attack on Yugoslavia in 1941, Bulgaria, an ally of Germany and Italy, seized Vardar Macedonia, and Italy - Aegean. According to the provisions of the peace treaty with Bulgaria in 1947, the borders of the three countries in historical Macedonia were drawn on the basis of the restoration of the pre-war status quo, however, the dispute over the Macedonian issue continued - first between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and in the 90s, after the collapse of the united Yugoslavia, - between independent Macedonia and Albania, which began to claim part of the Macedonian territory on the grounds that some areas of Macedonia are inhabited by ethnic Albanians.
Secondly, the question of the borders of Albania itself was also difficult to resolve. This country appeared on the political map only in 1913, after the First Balkan War, and its borders were determined by the London Peace Treaty between the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, and the small Balkan countries, on the other. The borders of the new state did not exactly coincide with the borders of the ethnic settlement of Albanians in the former Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Many Albanians lived in Serbia and Greece.
In 1939 Albania was occupied by Italy. When Germany and Italy attacked Yugoslavia in 1941, the Italian authorities created in their zone of occupation a puppet formation "Great Albania", including the province of Kosovo, which was torn away from Yugoslavia, (¦) where the Albanian minority lived. The Serbian population was expelled from the annexed territories, instead of which Albanian colonists arrived from Albania proper. The demographic composition of the population of Kosovo has changed. After the Second World War, the communists, who were under the influence of the Yugoslav leader, came to power in Albania with the help of the armed detachments of J.B. Tito. Albania did not express territorial claims to Yugoslavia. The Albanian delegation was not admitted to the Paris Peace Conference. Albania has not received any territorial augmentation, and its borders have remained the same as they were before World War II. The idea of recreating "Greater Albania" was revived in relations between Albania and its neighbors - the successor states of the former Yugoslavia in the 90s.
Thirdly, the problem of uniting the lands inhabited by Albanians into one whole was closely related to the rights of other ethnic minorities on the territory of many countries. of Eastern Europe... Not only the Albanians in the former Yugoslavia were subjected to various forms of discrimination (political, cultural, etc.). Bulgaria limited the rights of the Turks living on the Bulgarian territory, Greece forcibly assimilated the Macedonians. A painful humanitarian problem remained the question of several million Hungarians deported to Hungary from Czechoslovakia or scattered in different parts of Romania and the republics of the former Yugoslavia. From many Eastern European countries (Poland, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Romania, etc.), ethnic Germans were officially evicted or secretly squeezed out. The flow of Jewish settlers (primarily from Poland and other countries of Eastern Europe) reached out to Palestine and Western countries.
Finally, the mass of Ukrainians, as a rule, residents of Western Ukraine, soldiers, officers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which fought during the war against the Soviet Army on the side of Germany, and their families, as well as residents of the Baltic republics, fled to the West at the end of the war from the advancing Soviet troops. ... These people lost their civil status, experienced enormous difficulties in legalizing and restoring their rights. Many of them were also forced to leave Europe and seek refuge in the United States, Australia, Canada and South American countries.
On the whole, the territorial decisions of the late 1940s were of great importance for the stabilization of international relations in Europe, but they failed to provide a deep and final resolution of interstate contradictions in this part of the world.
By the beginning of the 20th century, the territorial division of the world was completely completed. Only its violent redistribution remained possible, and such attempts were made in the Spanish-American, Anglo-Boer, Russian-Japanese, Balkan and other wars, but especially in the first and second world wars. As a result of the First World War, the borders of almost all the belligerent countries changed; the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires collapsed, revolutions took place in Russia, Germany, Hungary, Turkey. The defeated colonies came under the control of the victorious countries - France, Great Britain, Japan. Received independence Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland. In Turkey, unprecedented "ethnic cleansing" took place - Armenians and Greeks were exterminated or deported. The communist regime, which had become entrenched in Russia, took a course towards "world revolution", opposing itself to the whole world.
Following the results of the Second World War, the borders of Germany, the USSR, Poland, Japan, China and other countries were changed; carried out interstate deportations of Germans, Hungarians, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Poles, Ukrainians, Japanese, and within the USSR - the peoples of the Crimea, the Caucasus and the Volga region. The Baltic countries, Moldova and Tuva became part of the USSR. Immediately after the war, an arms race unprecedented in scale and danger unfolded between the "socialist" and "imperialist" blocs of states - " cold war". The confrontation between the two systems led to the formation of two German states (West Germany and East Germany), two Korean states (North Korea and South Korea), two Chinese (PRC and Taiwan), two Vietnamese (North and South).
God settled people in their homeland. Forcibly separating from the homeland is tantamount to killing the spirit ("The Charter of the Germans Expelled from the Homeland"). The state of Israel was formed on the territory of Palestine in 1947, where the European Jews who survived the Nazi massacre went. The partition of Palestine led to conflict with the Arabs, and the Jews left the Muslim countries.
V Arab world in the 50-80 years. repeated attempts are being made to create a United Arab Republic (UAR). Alternately, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Libya concluded agreements on its formation, but the alliances either soon disintegrated or did not take place at all.
In accordance with the UN decision on the decolonization of the dependent territories, the "dissolution" of the colonial empires took place. Already in 1945-50. the countries of South and Southeast Asia gain independence. In the 50-60s. almost all colonies, protectorates and mandate territories in Africa, Asia and Caribbean America became politically independent. K ser. 70s colonies on Earth have practically disappeared. Among the independent states there were many smallest countries with scanty populations; all attempts to keep them within the framework of larger associations were unsuccessful.
Great Britain in the colonies did not destroy the traditional systems of power, but paid special attention to the training of administrative personnel from among local residents... The Englishman acted in the role of an adviser, and trained locals were engaged in direct execution of power functions. Independence was granted to the colonies after conscientious preparation of power structures (army, police, finance, political parties) and the suppression of unwanted movements (for example, Mau Mau in Kenya, communist partisans in Malaysia, etc.).
The result of British policy was the transformation of the empire into the Commonwealth of Nations, led by the English queen. Today's Commonwealth of Nations is a voluntary union of 56 states with a population of 1.5 billion people, in which Great Britain, without interfering in the internal affairs of countries, guarantees convertibility of local currencies, economic and military assistance, student education at British universities, etc. Political and economic situation in countries British Commonwealth generally better than in the former possessions of other powers.
France, Portugal, Belgium relied on the direct management of possessions, appointing their specialists sent from the metropolis as chiefs. This gave a gain in the effectiveness of the management apparatus, but the disadvantage was the relationship with local population: It is one thing when an official of your nationality is “pissed off” at you, and quite another thing when his nationality is different. To combat separatism, the practice was to declare possessions as "integral" parts of the state. Independence was provided to the colonies without much preparation, either "overnight" (the year of African Freedom - 1960), or after a long war (Vietnam, Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau).
The economic and political situation in most of the former possessions of these powers deteriorated; about 3 million European colonists and assimilated natives had to be evacuated. Former French and Portuguese territories dominate the world's hot spots. France remains the only metropolis that maintains a military presence to maintain order in the former colonies. The French Union, proclaimed after the dissolution of the empire, existed for only a few years - there were no people willing to remain in it. France's cooperation with former colonies is carried out only on the basis of bilateral agreements, and Portugal has completely lost ties with the former "overseas territories".
The Soviet "struggle for peace" after 1945 was marked by the participation of Soviet troops (with more than 1.5 million participants) in more than 30 local wars and conflicts. These include "restoring order" in Hungary, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia; support for "theirs" in China, Korea, Vietnam, Egypt, Algeria, Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, etc .; finally, the war in Afghanistan.
The natural result was economic (20% of the national income went to the army) and moral distress and collapse of the USSR, and with it the "socialist camp" and regimes of "socialist orientation". Overnight (isn't it the French version?), More than 20 new states emerged, some of which fell into the category of "hot spots" (Tajikistan, the countries of the Caucasus and the Balkans).
The latest changes on the political map are the formation of the Palestinian Authority in the Arab lands occupied by Israel (1996), the return of Hong Kong to China due to the expiration of its lease by Great Britain (1997).
Any spatial order limits all of its carriers and participants, that is, it provides them with spatial guarantees for the safety of their land. This leads to the main issue of international law. Namely: on the one hand, changes in the boundaries of territorial possessions are inevitable, and on the other hand, territorial changes can be extremely dangerous for the stability of the general spatial order.
a) Territorial changes outside and inside
international spatial
order
This is an old theoretical and practical, philosophical, legal and political problem. It arose in any international legal order "which included several independent power formations. To resolve it in the European international law of the 18th-19th centuries, a mechanism was developed for large peace conferences held under the auspices of the great powers. In the last years of the existence of the Geneva League of Nations. especially in period from 1936 to 1939, this issue was intensively discussed in the context of the question of peaceful change, peaceful change. But no matter how the changes occur, peacefully or as a result of war, this problem in its essence is always primarily a territorial issue, for it is generated by the entire all-encompassing spatial order in which territorial, and therefore spatial change must occur in such a way that not threaten that spatial order itself. Moreover, it goes without saying that the problem of peaceful change is not related to all the countless contractual and factual changes that occur daily and continuously in the common life of peoples. In reality, it refers only to the question of how new seizures of land and sea or their new divisions can be carried out, so that neither the existence of individual recognized participants in the existing international legal order nor its general structure is called into question. To this end, each international legal order, while it existed, put forward several more or less elastic principles and concepts, such as territorial
balance, natural boundaries, the right to self-determination of nations and peoples, delimitation of spheres of influence, spheres of interest, approval and recognition of more important areas of special interests. In addition, any international legal order, since it is inherently a spatial order, must develop a number of more or less elastic methods and techniques, for example, the recognition of new great powers and new states, official notifications of new territorial acquisitions, decisions of conferences, and often even the direct grant or award of certain territories. Directly legitimizing territorial changes and new acts of land distribution, all these methods serve to preserve and further develop the existing order as a whole, the order, the essence and structural core of which is spatial limitation, spatial order.
Not this or that, in many of its details, a more or less random territorial status quo of a certain historical moment, but the underlying nomos, its spatial structure, the unity of order and localization, should be protected by any international legal order if it does not want to overthrow itself ... At the same time, the recognition of wars, armed conflicts, reprisals and various methods of using force as a means of achieving change is not only quite possible, but often even necessary. But then these are limited processes that do not call into question the entire spatial order as a whole. It is not war as such that undermines order, but only certain goals of the war and methods of waging it, violating and denying the already established restrictions.
Therefore, do not repeat the widespread misconception that Averages
centuries appear as the kingdom of anarchy; such allegations do not correspond to reality, since the era of the Middle Ages, armed struggle and law and resistance were recognized by the institutions of E as methods of asserting and protecting law. international law XVII-XX centuries on the grounds that he allowed wars. In fact, the European interstate wars of the period from 1815 to 1914 were ordered, limited great powers, filled with legal content processes, in comparison with which modern police and peacekeeping measures against violators of peace and tranquility appear as actions aimed at destroying the enemy. Hans Weberg, theorist of international law and a well-known supporter of the pacifist movement, without making any distinctions between the concepts of war and peace, as something unconditional says that wherever any war is waged, anarchy always takes place. 2 Of course, there are such wars that call into question and abolish the previous order, but a truly scientific and legal formulation of the question does not affect the general moral or philosophical problem of war and its application in general! forces, but something completely different, namely, carried out by means of war or some other!
1 About this see: Otto Brunner. Land und Herrschaft. Grundfragen
der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Siidostdeutschlands im
Mittelalter. 2. Aufl. Brunn; Munchen; Wien, 1942.
2 For example, in his article “Universal or European
what international law? Discussion with Professor Carlo
Schmitt "(Universales oder europaisches Volkerrecht? Tin
Auseinandersetzung mit Professor Carl Schmitt // Der Zeitschn
Die Friedenswarte. 1941. Nr. 4.S. 157 ff.).
the way of changes in the territorial status quo and their impact on the spatial order of a particular era, until then generally recognized.
Of course, wars between such great powers, which are the guarantors of a certain spatial order, can easily destroy the spatial order if they are not fought for any free space and not in any free space. In this case, such wars become total in the sense that they should entail the constitution of some new spatial order. But how are there such ways of seizing land and territorial changes that remain within the existing spatial order and even are a means of maintaining it, and such ways of seizing land that call this spatial order into question and destroy it, so exist - and on the same grounds - and such wars that remain within the framework of a certain international legal order. The essence of European international law was the limitation of war, the essence of such a limited war was an orderly competition of forces unfolding in a limited space and in front of witnesses. Such wars are the opposite of disorder. They contain the highest form of order that human strength is capable of. They are the only form of defense against the vicious circle of more and more brutal reprisals, that is, from nihilistic actions dictated by hatred and thirst for revenge, the senseless purpose of which is mutual destruction. The elimination or avoidance of a war of annihilation is possible only by finding some form for the competition of forces. And this, in turn, is possible only thanks to the admission against
16 Carl Schmitt
Nika as his equal enemy, Justus hostis.TeM is laying the foundation for limiting the war
Thus, it is completely unacceptable to indiscriminately characterize as anarchy any use of force that takes the form of war and to consider this characterization as the last word on the international legal problem of war. The restriction, but by no means the abolition of war, has until now been the true result of the development of law, the only achievement of international law. However, the use of the word "anarchy" is typical for those who have not yet advanced enough in their intellectual development to learn to distinguish between anarchy and nihilism.
Therefore, we must reiterate that, compared to nihilism, anarchy is not the worst. Anarchy and law do not have to be mutually exclusive. The right to resistance and self-defense can be a legal right, while a number of provisions functioning without encountering any resistance and rejecting even the thought of self-defense, or some tacitly destroying system of norms and sanctions for any violator, on the contrary, can represent a form of cruel, nihilistic destruction of every right. The great problems of international law are by no means as simple as the pacifists of the League of Nations with their sore "anarchy" imagine. The 1920 Geneva League of Nations system was something even smaller and worse than anarchy, while the anarchic methods of the Middle Ages were by no means nihilism. They reflected and preserved, and it is easy to prove, the true right, which consisted in a clear localization and reliable order. And it is precisely this moment that is decisive, because under such conditions it is possible to distinguish meaningful wars from wars of destruction and save the possibility of the existence of a specific
order from tabula rasa nihilistic lawmaking.
The final land grab, carried out in a limited area and resulting in a clash between two participants in their common international legal order, raises particularly difficult questions. In such cases, the seizure of land is, from an international legal point of view, internal. It affects not free land lying outside the general spatial order, but the right of land owners recognized in accordance with international law. Therefore, the transfer of territory is carried out within the framework of the general spatial order and covers land that is not subject to free occupation. If such a territorial change, in all likelihood, does not lead to the destruction of the general spatial order, then this change should remain within the general spatial order, occur in a strictly defined way and find recognition. Despite the transfer of territory, it will not destroy and negate the spatial structure of the whole. The very question of whether the transfer of territory undermines the structure of the existing order or is consistent with it, can be solved only jointly, i.e., within the framework of the general order, which, however, does not mean that this joint decision should be a kind of formal and categorical act of some centralized authority. Without a common solution and common acceptance, the general order will break up on this spatial issue.
The problem is very difficult even if a free and voluntary agreement is actually concluded between the ceding territory and the recipient of the general spatial order, and the transfer of land is governed by specific agreements concluded directly by the territorially interested parties themselves.
parties. After all, it is in this, in that who here is interested party, actually 5 is the question. In the question of the structure of a general "all-encompassing spatial order, all states are interested parties. A purely territorial acquisition (or loss) of land, referring only to the direct transfer of specific areas, should be distinguished from an interest in the existence of a general spatial order. The interest of indirectly interested parties may be no less than deeper than the interest of those who directly acquire or lose land. inter alios,] contains petitio principii. 2 Nobody is alius, * when the general space and the spatial order that encompasses all are called into question.
The linking nature of spatial order will become quite obvious to us if we represent spatial order as balance. The meaning of the notion of political equilibrium consisted only in the fact that it expresses the spatial order that encompasses European states. The change in equilibrium or a threat to it concerned all its participants, and not just the direct partners in the contract. Therefore, in the era from the conclusion of the Utrecht Peace Treaty (1713) to the end of the 19th century, the balance between the European powers was rightfully considered the basis and guarantee of European international law. The consequence of this was that the sphere of interests of each power included any important territory
1 Between strangers (lat.).
2
Anticipation of the foundation (lat.)- logical error,
which consists in the latent assumption of an unproven presupposition
links for proof.
3 Outsider (lat.).
There was a major change within the European system of states, while gigantic territorial acquisitions outside Europe, such as Russia's annexation of Siberia, went almost unnoticed. The generally accepted spatial order of the European continent finds expression in the concept of European equilibrium. Anyone who starts a European war knows that all European powers are interested in its outcome. Bismarck's diplomatic skill consisted in the fact that in 1864, 1866 and even in 1871 he was able to achieve a "lightning-fast peace" before the onset of inevitable subsequent complications. The community generated by the spatial order is more important than anything that we have said about sovereignty and prohibitions on intervention. We are not talking here about a political and propagandistic assessment of this policy of equilibrium, but about the understanding that the idea of equilibrium in some specific way derives its origin from a certain relationship to space and that it, in turn, manifests the idea of an all-encompassing spatial order. 1 This, in spite of any possible criticism and in spite of all political abuses, is the enormous practical superiority of the very concept of equilibrium, for it contains the possibility of initiating the limitation of war.
"" Every arrangement of the map of Europe is regarded of general interest to all members of the European political system, and any of them may claim to have a voice in it " members of the European political system, and each of them can demand the right to vote in this matter.) John Westlake emphatically calls this "the universal legal idea of natural growth" (Collected , Papers. 1914. S. 122).
In many respects, the word “equilibre in equilibrium, and its corresponding representation still today for many means nothing more than any balanced order of forces mutually compensating each other. As a result, the image of the balance of forces is also used where spatial representations are simply excluded. In addition, order, which keeps itself in balance by mutual equality of forces, is by no means necessary. It may also be the case that the hegemony of any one force, far superior to all in its power, keeps in order numerous medium and small forces. Constantin Franz, in his doctrine of federalism, recognized as such only such federalism, which is based exclusively on equilibrium, while a system based on hegemony, he denied both the character of equilibrium and the character of true federalism. However, in political reality there are also hegemony-based equilibrium and hegemony-based federalism, as exemplified by the German Empire constructed by Bismarck. 1 Prussia was the recognized hegemon in it; but, despite this, the question of whether it was possible to distribute and, if possible, how it would be necessary to distribute the territory of Alsace and Lorraine acquired in 1871 between the adjacent lands - Prussia, Bavaria and Baden, was a territorial problem concerning and other states that were part of the Empire, in particular, for example, Württemberg. Important spatial
1 The leading expert in the field of federalist constitutional law Karl Bilfinger | K-ag Bilfinger] has written about this a lot; see, for example, his speech at the Congress of the Association of German Theorists of State Law in 1924 i Jena (Bd 1. Der Schriften dieser Vereinigung. Berlin, 1924).
These problems affect the interests of all. Creation imperial land Alsace-Lorraine meant that this truth was taken into account, and in this respect represented a neutral decision. In addition, Bismarck, in order not to create spatial problems within the federation, abandoned the plan of voluntarily joining Prussia even for such a small land as Waldeck. Even after the Schwarz-burg-Sonderhausen line was liquidated in 1909, this small land remained separated from the principality of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, whose prince, through personal union, became the head of both lands.
B) Territorial changes within the jus publicum Europaeum
In the history of European interstate international law, all significant territorial changes, the formation of new states, the proclamation of independence and neutrality were formalized as collective agreements and were implemented at European conferences or at least sanctioned by them. The proclamation of permanent neutrality - by Switzerland in 1815 and Belgium in 1831/39 - was primarily the subject of collective agreements of the great European powers, because thanks to it, certain state territories received a special international legal status, ceasing to be an arena of war. Collective agreements resulting from the great European peace conferences of 1648, 1713, 1814/15, 1856, 1878, 1885 (the Conference on the Congo) mark separate stages in the development of this international law, understood as a spatial order. While meetings and decisions
Paris conferences of 1918-19, which led to the treaties concluded in the suburbs of Paris Versailles, Saint-Germain, Trianon and Neuilly, only at first glance adhere to this tradition. In reality, as we will show later, they lacked any idea of a specific spatial structure. Previous European conferences clearly demonstrate that the basis of interstate international law was an all-encompassing Eurocentric spatial order, within which, as a result of joint meetings and decisions, the methods and methods of all important territorial changes were developed, and the idea of equilibrium acquired its true meaning.
The leading role here is played by the great powers, for they are more interested in the general spatial order. This is precisely the essence of a great power, since this expression not only denotes any powerful force, but also extremely accurately characterizes that exceptional position within the framework of the existing order, which several great powers are recognized as such.
The recognition of a state as a great power by another great power is the highest form of international legal recognition. Such recognition presupposes that those who recognize each other express recognition of the highest degree, recognizing each other as mutually recognizing each other. So, in the 17th century Russia and Prussia, and in the 19th Italy (1867) were able to stand side by side with the former great powers and were recognized as great powers. The recognition as a great power of the United States of America, dated in textbooks in 1865, presents a special, unique problem of the 19th century, because the principles foreign policy U.S.A,
formulated in the Monroe Doctrine (1823), in fact, include the denial of any such recognition expressed by the European powers. The very line of the Western Hemisphere itself is an expression of polemical doubt that a specifically European spatial order is a global order. The recognition of Japan as a great power dates back immediately to both 1894 and the period immediately after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05. Accordingly, both wars victorious for Japan are seen as a kind of entrance fee required to join the narrow circle of great powers that support international law. The Japanese themselves considered their participation in the punitive expedition of the great powers against China (1900) to be a decisive event. With the emergence of the East Asian great power, the transition to a new, no longer Euro-centric world order began.
These historical dates themselves show that recognition as a great power is primarily associated with spatial order and is an important process affecting the spatial structure of international law. And not only because jus belli and Justus hostis acquire its highest importance in being recognized as a great power, but also for a reason that affects a specific spatial order. Recognition as a great power is an international legal institution essential to land grab issues. In the context of the realities of European interstate law, it means the right to participate in European conferences and negotiations. In the 19th century, this recognition meant for the German Empire and Italy access to colonial acquisitions in Africa and southern seas... The Congo Conference, which we will talk about later, is a very instructive one.
an example in this respect. Thus, recognition as a great power at all times has been just as important a legal institution as the recognition of a new state or government "however, since 1890, this latter is usually meant when it comes to international legal recognition as a legal institution. ...
Great powers, as bearers and guarantors of the spatial order established by them, consecrated with their recognition any important territorial change. It goes without saying that every recognition of a new state has a spatial character by its very nature. In essence, it is a declaration about territorial change, the content of which is that the entire aggregate structure of the existing general spatial order is able to withstand this change. As for the recognized state itself, in some cases, especially when it comes to small states, for example, the Balkan states that emerged in 1856 and 1878, this recognition may actually represent a kind of international legal decision, adjudicatio. Nothing demonstrates to us more clearly that the universal connection that gives the interstate order of sovereign powers its legal force is not based on the supposedly sovereign will of each participant in this order, but is conditioned by their belonging to a common space for them and a common land, the distribution of which constitutes an all-encompassing nomos. of this order.
If any peace treaty provides for important territorial changes, it will in any case affect the entire cumulative specific order, and since the war between members of a single international legal community in accordance with
by its very meaning inevitably leads to the conclusion of a peace treaty, then in all important cases, even in the course of the war, the interest of all non-belligerent powers should also be revealed. All wars waged between European powers on European soil are always the subject of close attention of all the great European powers, even if they adhere to neutrality, and these powers always influence their outcome. No one takes this deep interest as interference, and every European statesman takes it for granted and thus justified. The right to freedom of war, the sovereign jus ad bellum, provided each participant in this order with the opportunity at any time to show, including formally, their interest and thereby, if necessary, impose on others their participation in general discussions and decision-making. However, European international law, supported by the great European powers, even without this kind of coercion allowed relatively flexible and tolerant forms of holding important European conferences and made it possible to implement the decisions made at them to adapt to a specific spatial situation, until, as a result of the collapse of a specifically European order, it collapsed, dissolving in a kind of spaceless universalism, the old spatial order, and no new one has come to replace it. This was more and more clearly manifested not only at the already mentioned Paris peace conferences of 1919/20, but in their continuation - at the conferences of the Assembly and Council of the Geneva League of Nations in the period from 1920 to 1938, which were unable to accept a single true decisions, because the content of their decisions was not the old, specific
not a European, nor a new global spatial order. We have yet to talk about this in the next chapter.
« c) State succession in jus publicum< Europaeum (in final land grab)
For the legal registration of the final seizure of land, which is carried out within the existing international legal space and in the course of which one member of the international legal community appropriates land to another, the doctrine of state succession. V late XIX century, this teaching, like other doctrines of this system, has reached the classical definition for this era. An excellent example of this is Max Huber's work on state succession (1898). Lawyers - adherents of positive contract law easily solve this problem; for them, indeed, exactly what is positively present in the contract. However, this does not take into account the rights of third countries. In addition, the agreement contains deliberately unresolved issues. Further, there are such contractual rules, which can be the expression opinio necessitatis, legal conviction, and, finally, there are cases of state succession not enshrined in treaties, arising primarily when the enemy's state existence is destroyed as a result of war, when debellatio * and during the formation of a new state due to the separation of a part of a state.
In general, all theorists agree that during the so-called state succession, there is a change in the territorial state supreme
"The end of the war (lat.).
power, as a result of which the land affected by this change comes under the control of some other than before, the state center of power. On this basis, in the XIX-XX centuries, the so-called state succession arises as a typical legal institution that legally formalizes land grabbing carried out within the framework of the existing spatial order. The meaning of considering the change of state power over a certain territory as succession consists in substantiating international legal requirements and international legal obligations in relation to the new territorial ruler. Naturally, the new territorial ruler will have to take into account a wide variety of things. He will more or less carefully deal with the legal relations that he found in the acquired territory; he will continue to pay salaries and pensions to former civil servants; often he recognizes and assumes the state debts of his predecessor, etc. In addition, it will be quite natural if the new ruler, unless he is hindered by political circumstances, retains the so-called easements operating on the acquired territory. However, the precedent cases put forward as arguments in this matter are very contradictory and in no way are binding. It is here that the method of empty normative generalizations appears in all its abstractness leading to errors and errors, because in the face of a typical spatial problem, the problem of territorial change, in principle it does not allow resorting to any specific spatial point of view. So, for example, the situation in which the overseas colony, still completely remote by the concepts of that era, upon gaining independence, refused to recognize the state
debts (the United States of America in 1781) is considered at the same level either with the intra-European or even intra-German land seizure (recognition in 1866 by Prussia of the state debts of defeated Hanover), or with the intra-European situation of a completely different kind (non-recognition of the French state by the German Empire) debts concerning Alsace-Lorraine in 1871); and this situation, in turn, is placed on a par with the annexation of the Transvaal (1902). Of course, in the era of disintegration, the practical meaning of such an obscure and contradictory normativeism was precisely to put forward an argument with all conflicting interests that could be used depending on the specific situation and not oblige anyone to anything. However, as we are assured, everyone is unanimous at least that the new ruler must respect private acquired rights. The international arbitration in The Hague (in the opinion of September 10, 1923 and in the judgment No. 7 of June 25, 1926 in the case of the dispute between the German Empire and Poland over Upper Silesia) used its authority to confirm this provision, so that it is spoken of as on a recognized legal principle. Let us try to extract the core of a real, concrete order from the jumble of conflicting opinions and precedents.
The first question is: in what sense can we speak of continuity or succession during the final seizure of land, which is now called state succession? Are the rights that the new ruler of the earth has, and the duties performed by him, at least partially identical with the rights and duties of the former ruler? Or is there no legal connection between them, unless it is established by the sovereign will of the new ruler? If this process is considered exclusively with
the point of view of an isolated sovereign territorial state, the situation is extremely clear: the state territory is the arena of power; when the territory is transferred, one bearer of power leaves the stage and another sovereign bearer of power emerges on the stage; the adoption by the new territorial ruler of supreme power over the acquired land - the seizure of land - can only be understood in such a way that the former territorial supreme power effectively disappears, and the new one effectively appears. As a matter of fact, in relations between two sovereign states there can be no talk of continuity in the sense of both the derivation of some rights from others, derivation, and inclusion in the previous legal situation. This suggests an analogy with the constructions of the old Roman law describing the acquisition of things, which did not know the derivative acquisition of things. In interstate international law, where everything depends on the effectiveness of the sovereign possession of power, it seems that there can be no continuity other than that which is carried out by will new ruler.
However, despite this, certain international legal requirements and obligations in relation to third states must also take place here. The transfer of territory occurs within the framework of the continuing spatial order. In other words, land grabbing must be institutionalized in an international legal sense. In the final seizure of land, this problem is something completely different from the temporary seizure, the order of which found its legal form in the legal institution of military occupation; we will discuss this type of land grab in the next section. As for the final seizure of land we are now considering, under him the former ruler of the seizure
chennai land finally removed, removed For thinking oriented towards isolated, isolated state sovereignty, it is deletion from the country, this cedere, 1 clearing the way for the new ruler taking his place means that the new ruler becomes the original acquirer. Therefore, continental theorists are international. go right, such French and German authors as J. Gidel, Fr. von List, W. Schönborn, in general, tend to deny legal continuity. In this case, the initial acquisition means practically the sovereign freedom of the new ruler in dealing with the acquired territory, his position in any respect is non-binding, which as a legal position is extremely beneficial to the acquirer, and therefore defended by him in all controversial cases.
Nevertheless, at least in the acquisition of European land, there is always a certain succession, although it cannot be called a state one. After all, the transfer of land takes place within the framework of an all-encompassing spatial order, the structure of which includes both the former and the new ruler of the transferred territory. Thanks to this, a certain continuity is established, which is explained not by a special and isolated relationship between the previous and subsequent holder of the supreme territorial power, but by the fact that both, both before the transfer of land and after, belong to the same space and its order. Anglo-Saxon authors such as T.J. Lawrence, J. Westlake, L. Oppenheim, Halleck, J. Bassett Moore did not hesitate to speak of legal succession in the sense of derivative derivative acquisition. In its generality, such a design was more advantageous. third
1 Retreat, leave, retire (lat.). 256
to them countries than the acquirer, as a result of which it was just as often put forward by them as an argument against the acquirer, as the opposite construction of the original acquisition, which untied the hands of the acquirers, was put forward by the latter as an argument in their favor. For example, after the debellatio in the Transvaal (1902), the English government abandoned any obligations arising from the construction of legal succession, and A. Berridale Keith in his "Theory of State Succession" (1904) legally substantiated this position, unfortunately, despite the subtitle of his work (with special reference to English and Colonial Law), 1 without resorting to a spatial point of view, which alone could clarify the matter. The acquisition of South African land at that time could still be seen as a process unfolding outside the framework of European international law. However, even when legal succession is denied, on the basis of other arguments, for example, customary law or the presumption of state will, or with the help of civil or general concepts (such as enrichment, imputation of duties, taking possession of property), various kind of legal obligations, in their practical result identical or close to legal continuity. In most cases, moral considerations are quite effective, and in the case of the Transvaal, England actually admitted debts, although it rejected purely legal obligations.
We would like to leave aside the outer side of this kind of discussion and draw attention to two essential aspects that sometimes come up in
Card Sch M11GT 257
The quality of the decisive arguments. The first is a spatial point of view. In one particular case, namely the question of the demilitarization of the Aland Islands, it won a strikingly convincing victory, displacing such civil analogies as the easement. When the Council of the Geneva League, with reference to paragraph 11 of the pact, took up the case of the Aland the islands by a commitment made by the former ruler of this territory (Russia) at the Paris Congress of 1856; at the same time, the committee motivated its decision by the fact that this obligation was an integral part of droit commun eigoreen. 1 The treaty justifying the commitment to demilitarization was concluded by the obligated party, Russia, England and France, signed by these three powers and unambiguously characterized by them as an integral part of the general collective agreement, the Paris Treaty of 1856, “pour consolider par la les bienfaits de la paix generate ". 2 In principle, such a reference to droit commun eiyureep possible when considering any issue affecting certain obligations arising from this kind of collective agreements of the great powers. However, in this case, on the issue of demilitarization of the important for domination over Baltic Sea islands, the appeal to European law had a very specific meaning, and it was she who became the decisive circumstance, for the collective
1 European common law (fr.).
2
To thereby consolidate the benefits of universal peace
(fr.).
The interest referred to here was not any particular interest, but the question of the general European spatial order maintained by the great European powers. While there was a specifically European spatial order supported by the great European powers, such an approach to solving legal issues was justified and convincing, taking precedence over all legal constructions that proceeded from the concepts of easement and legal succession. Within the framework of the Geneva League pact, this argument lost its force, and references to droit commun eigoreen began to look anachronistic and apocryphal, because in this pact, as we will show below, no (and above all European) spatial order was not taken into account.
The second aspect, shedding light on the contradictory doctrine of state succession, relates to the economic side of the spatial problem. He explains the unanimity already mentioned by us, with which the principle of respect for private acquired rights is recognized. This aspect is related to the tacitly accepted premise of everything classic the doctrine of state succession as a whole, consisting in the fact that all states interested in the transfer of territory, in principle, recognize the same economic order, even if they are at completely different stages of development. A single, generally recognized economic system creates a common economic space. In the 19th century, this was the order of a free, self-governing economy. The customs barriers of this era by no means abolished the most fundamental fact of a common free economy. Thus, in the economic sphere, a special international legal space has been formed, a common free market that has stepped over the political boundaries of sovereign states.
To use the terms of constitutional law, there was a certain relationship common to all states of this international legal order between public and private law, between the state and a society free from the state.
This standard is tacitly and as a matter of course assumed both in practice and in the theory of state succession (however, as well as in the international legal form of military occupation carried out in the course of a land war) and lies at the basis of all its arguments and constructions. Due to the fact that state power (imperium or jurisdictio) governed by the area of public law is clearly separated from property (dominium) related to the area of private law, it becomes possible to exclude from the scope of legal consideration the most difficult issue of the total change of the constitutional order due to the transfer of territory. Behind the facade of the recognized state sovereignty remained the area of private life, which in this respect means primarily the sphere of the private economy and private property, largely unaffected by the transfer of territory. And free, that is, liberal, supported by private entrepreneurs and merchants, the international market order, and to the same extent free world international trade, and the freedom of movement of capital and work force- all these economic freedoms received practically all the most important international guarantees they needed during the transfer of the territory. For all civilized states of this era, both the separation of public and private law and the standard of liberal constitutionalism, for which property, and thus trade, economy and industry belong to the protected sphere, were common.
the constitutional right of private property. All those interested in the transfer of the territory of the state regarded this constitutional standard as generally recognized in principle. This is the decisive circumstance for our problem: the transfer of territory does not imply change of constitutional order in the sense of changing the social and property order. In this respect, the order of ownership is part of the international legal order. For the practice of interstate life, this circumstance is more important than any private issues; it determines to a greater extent the actual legal nature of the transfer of territory than the seemingly absolute formulations of state sovereignty, as well as the seemingly so radical distinctions between internal and external, public and private. Acting as a component of the spatial order, the universal standard of constitutionalism has more influence than any dualistic constructions related to the state, with their supposed absolute separation of internal and external. 1 In the 19th century, the transfer of territory carried out in accordance with interstate law is only a transfer of public law power, and not a change in the economic and property order. The transfer of territory, which would simultaneously bring with it a radical change in the order of ownership in the corresponding territory, would be perceived in this era as an action that only the Bolsheviks are capable of. While being carried out within the inter-
On the relationship between the two types of dualism (meaning, on the one hand, the dualism of interstate and intrastate, and on the other, public and private) see: Carl Schmitt. Der Festschrift fur Georgios Streit. Athen, 1939; abgedruckt in Positionen und Begriffe. Hamburg, 1940. S. 261 fi.
international law, the seizure of state territory concerned only state power, imperium, it was accompanied by the principled observance of internal private-legal land ownership. In this era, this was of significant practical importance. The 1919 treaties on the outskirts of Paris allowed significant interference in German private property, but overall still maintained a principled commitment to upholding the constitutional standard, so advocates of German interests were well placed to defend their arguments. The idea that any state, by virtue of its sovereignty, can introduce some other economic system, except for a free economy, was out of sight of the authors of traditional international legal constructions. Due to the presence of a generally recognized, universally the same economic system free market economy thesis cujus regio ejus economia did not carry any danger, because all states that were part of a single international legal community remained within the same economic system.
A completely different problem than the seizure of land, carried out in Europe in the form of the transfer of state power over a certain state territory and accompanied by the preservation of the private legal and property order, was the seizure of land free for colonization outside the European continent. This land was free for occupation as long as it did not yet belong to any state in the sense of intra-European interstate law. Among absolutely uncivilized peoples, the power of the indigenous leaders was not imperium, and the use of the land by the natives could not be called property. Therefore, here it was impossible to talk about
any legal succession, and this was the case even when the European invaders of the land entered into any agreements with the native kings and leaders and, for one reason or another, considered these agreements as binding. The state carrying out the seizure of land should not have taken into account the rights to land, which at the time of the seizure were in effect on the acquired territory, if it was not about the private property of citizens of civilized states participating in the order of interstate international law. The question of whether or not it is possible to consider the attitude of the natives to the land on which they were engaged in agriculture, cattle breeding or hunting at the moment when they were overtaken by the European state occupying the land, as property, was a question devoid of any practical significance, and the answer to it was the exclusive prerogative of the land-grabbing state. International legal arguments in favor of natives' land rights, such as those that, during the state succession of the liberal era, were put forward in favor of private ownership of land and in favor of acquired rights, were not put forward with respect to the colonized territories.
From an international legal point of view, the state that seizes land can consider the seized colonial land as land without an owner, as in relation to private property, dominium, and in relation to state power, imperium. It can abolish the land rights of the natives and declare itself the sole owner of the entire seized land; it can arrogate to itself the rights of the native leaders, and it does not matter whether this entry is a form of true legal succession or not; it may establish an exception
state ownership of land and condition it on a definite recognition of the rights of the natives to use it; it can introduce public property under the tutelage of the state; in addition, it can admit the existence of the rights of the natives to use the land and distinguish them as a kind dominium eminens) All these possibilities were really realized in the practice of the colonial seizure of land in the XIX-XX centuries. 2 These are questions that do not relate either to interstate international law, or to private international law, or even to a purely domestic sphere. Special land status of the colonies becomes as obvious here as the separation of the surface Globe to normal state territory and colonial land. This division defines the structure of international law of this era and belongs to its spatial structure. Of course, as the land of the overseas colonies was equated with state territory, that is, towards the land of the European continent, the structure of international law also changed, and specifically European international law was coming to an end. Thanks to this, a certain ideological aspect appears in the concept of a colony, affecting primarily the European countries possessing colonies.
1 Special kind of possession (lat.).
2
For this, see the work of Wilhelm, already cited above.
Wengler ( Wilhelm Wengler. Vergleichende Betrachtungen tiber die
Rechtsformen des Grundbesitzes der Eingeborenen. Beitrage zur
Kolonialforschung. Bd III. Berlin, 1942, S. 88 ff.).
d) Occupatio bellica in the jus publicum Europaeum "(temporary mastery)
The international legal logic of the specific order of European international law is entirely based on the fact of the existence of sovereign territorial states governed by central governments. This gives rise to an answer to the literally asking question about the international legal consequences of the military occupation of another territory, but located within the framework of the general spatial order. This issue touches upon the international legal problem of land grabbing, not subject to free occupation, and therefore is important in the context of our reasoning.
As long as the war is fought, motivated by international legal claims, consistent with the principles of feudal law or dynastic inheritance, it represents the exercise or use of law through the independent use of force. Thus, a certain confusion is introduced into the formal clarity and definiteness of pure statehood, which the concept of the state brought with it. For the feudal lord, who himself exercises his right to war and the use of force, there is no room at all for a special legal institution. occupatio bellica, military occupation. The war he is waging is pure defense of his own right. What he took from his opponent, he keeps for himself, exercising his legal right or securing a pledge of his legal right. This kind of protection of one's right in no way can recognize the temporary exercise of the right, for the seizure of the territory taken from the enemy by right is in itself already a final, and not a temporary exercise of the right.
But even with the recognition of the non-discriminatory concept of war of interstate international law of sovereign states, this problem remains very, very difficult. In this case, there is also no special legal institution of military occupation, although, of course, due to completely different grounds opposite to medieval times. It should be assumed that state sovereignty, which includes effective, organized state power over a delimited territorial space, by itself extends to any area subordinate to the effective state power inherent in this sovereignty. Therefore, the logic of interstate international law of sovereign states would be consistent with a situation in which any effective military-state occupation of any territory would be associated with the direct transfer of sovereignty over the occupied territory, unless the occupying state itself, having expressed its sovereign will, itself wishes so that sovereignty is not transferred to him, but to some other sovereign. Practically along with the formation of the modern state in the 17th-18th centuries, the practice of direct transfer of sovereignty accompanying the military occupation also arises. deplacement immediateat de souverainete. Of course, numerous residual phenomena of medieval, feudal and dynastic ideas were present in it, introducing a certain confusion into it, and within the framework of the German Empire it was influenced by the non-state nature of this empire. The wars of the 17th-16th centuries were for the most part waged as wars of dynastic inheritance. In the literature of that era, an occupier who immediately, that is, without waiting for the conclusion of peace or the end of the war, took the place of the former sovereign, was designated a technical
Czech term usurper." In addition, during the coalition wars, it often remained unclear for whom the occupying army occupied the territory it occupied. In addition, in practical terms, this issue was by no means of such colossal importance as in the 20th century. Indeed, in the 18th century, the occupier, as a rule, retained the former, and above all private law: private property and acquired rights, and therefore the entire social structure, remained largely intact. Due to the religious tolerance of enlightened absolutism, beginning in the 18th century, the change of sovereigns did not usually affect church relations either.
Thus, the problem of seizure of land that accompanied the occupation was by no means always realized in all its practical acuteness. The direct transfer of sovereignty, which took place as a result of military occupation, almost never turned into a total seizure of land. It did not affect the system in the full social and economic sense of the word, but only the personality of the ruler and his entourage, as well as the system of government and justice. This was also reflected in the purely formal nature of the modern concept of the state, thanks to which a specific order was created, at least to the extent that it was about the territorial states of the European
1 So in: Sam. de Cocceji. De regirnine usurpatoris. Frankfurt (Oder), 1702 (see also his commentary on Grotius. I p. 4, § 15 and III p. 6, § 9). Of no small importance was the fact that the elaboration of the problem carried out within the framework of Roman law jus postliminii[the right to return to the previous position] referred to section 15, 14 of the Theodosius Code, to which a subtitle was sent: De Infirmandis his quae sub tyrannis aut barbaris gesta sunt[On the nullity of provisions introduced under the rule of tyrants or barbarians].
sky continent. The centralized European state replaced medieval legal concepts and legal states, imbued with obligations of personal devotion, with objective and clearly calculated norms of a territorially closed sovereign state.
The French historian of law I. Lamer summarized the huge material he collected in local archives on the practice deplacement immediateat de souverainete and containing numerous examples from the history of French, Spanish and Italian wars of the 17th-18th centuries. In general, his narrative is rather free in nature and devoid of conceptual rigor, but its central idea is completely clear, and its significance for the history of international law and the formation of the concept of the state is much higher than other theoretical platitudes of the teaching on natural law or other pseudo-legal arguments of the reproductive construction of the Roman civil law, positivist international law of that era. Both of these areas of international law, otherwise so very different from each other as regards the issue of interest to us, demonstrate exactly the same helplessness. Lamer shows how the practice of state sovereignty eliminates the ambiguities of the medieval legal situation. References to the protection and exercise of a right, such as feudal law or German imperial law, as advocated through war and the use of force, now turn out to be confusing and confusing, in a word, dubious. Everything that is not connected with the state becomes unclear and dubious; all this immediately disappears as soon as an independent, self-contained territorial state appears with its extremely clearly defined sovereignty. It distributes
Gvoyu centralized state power over the entire territory of solid land, which was actually occupied by his army. At the same time, there is no need to wait for the conclusion of a peace treaty; the fact of conquest, understood in the sense of an effective occupation, is enough. Enough effective administrative management to, if the occupier so desires, carry out a direct transfer of sovereignty, subordinate the inhabitants and authorities of the occupied territory to the new sovereign, turning him into a source of supreme power in the occupied territory.
Lamer demonstrates this on the example of the justice system and all kinds of administrative bodies of the occupied territories of the 17th-18th centuries. At first glance, an insignificant, but illustrative example, to which he rightly attaches great importance, "is an almost instantaneous change of the official certificates of notaries. The inhabitants of the occupied territory immediately begin to be considered by the new sovereign as their subjects. The new sovereign is the legislator, at the same time secretly and as for granted, it is assumed that it will remain within the jus publicum Europaeum, that it will basically preserve the old law and old institutions and respect the rights and private property acquired.
" henee Lameire. Theorie et pratique de la conquete de l "ancien droit. Etude de droit international ancien. Bd 1-5. Paris, 1902-1911. The author presents the reader with the enormous material he has collected before the reader and refuses any" synthesis ", leaving it to the reader. ”This makes it difficult to read. However, I understand the particular interest with which Maurice Oriou (Precis de droit Public. 1916. S-339 Anm.) reacted to this book, for the history of international and national law it is much more important than many state-theoretical constructions, and allows you to understand the structure of purely state international law, as well as its non-
A certain correction of this, only at first glance, a radical transfer of sovereignty is carried out through an extremely unclear jus postliminij"extending both to the adversary state as such, and to individuals and private legal relations. 2
But when the European wars merged with the political and social revolution, it became clear within just a few years what military occupation could mean, bringing with it an immediate transfer of sovereignty that does not remain within an overarching homogeneous spatial order. The French revolutionary armies, marching in Belgium, Germany, Italy and Switzerland since 1792, having occupied any territory, immediately proclaimed freedom people and the abolition of feudal privileges. Thus, the military occupation now caused shift state structure in the full political, economic and social meaning of the word. After the victory of the Legitimist restoration in 1815, such a situation
capacity with international law of the Middle Ages. Any specific order of state international law consists of a territorial organizational form "state", and not in some kind of torn from her right. The fact that interstate relations are something completely different from international legal relations that existed within the framework of the feudal system and the Empire is demonstrated in this book by the example of the military conquest.
1 Right to restoration of rights (lat.).
2
For more on this see: Grotius. III. nine; Vattel. III. fourteen; A. W. Hefter. Das
europaische Volkerrrecht der Gegenwart. 3. Aufl. S. 324 ff. (after
actual liberation from enemy power violated
war relations "return to their previous rut") -
Hefter distinguishes between postliminium "international and state
military authorities "and postliminium of individuals and private
shenii.
None of the cases was naturally considered a gross violation of the principles of international law. But although the Legitimist restoration succeeded in restoring some privileges, it was unable to prevent the pan-European triumph of the bourgeois, liberal-constitutional state system. The principled respect for private property remained; it also corresponded to the principles of constitutionalism, and therefore was fundamentally respected even during state structure new type.
It was Talleyrand, who successfully defended the principle of dynastic legitimacy at the Congress of Vienna, who was at the same time an ardent defender of the purely state character of the war. At the same time, he considered the war between European territorial states as legitimate from the point of view of international law, waged on both sides justi hostes war, and contrasted this type of war as the only one corresponding to the international legal concept of war to the English naval war. But a purely state war is wholly and completely based on modern, and not feudal-medieval or class principles. Therefore, the restoration of the purely military state character of the war was immeasurably more important than any dynastic legitimacy and than all the restored noble privileges. For international law, the form of limiting war is decisive, and if war becomes an exclusively interstate clash, it should not affect the non-state sphere, especially the economy, trade and the entire area of civil society. In this case, the military occupation cannot affect and political system, that is, the principles of the civil-constitutional system. The occupation should not change anything in the economic and social structure of the occupation.
> bathroom territory, and the bearer of occupation powers should be - despite the widespread distrust of the military - an army commander, and not any civilian
i commissioner.
The Napoleonic Wars raised numerous legal questions about the orders given by the military occupiers and successive territorial authorities. First of all, they concerned the sale and purchase of land holdings and the collection of government obligations. During this period, lawyers of individual German states developed the idea of state sovereignty in the direction of even greater objectivity and separated the state as such from the specific carriers of state power. The principle of continuity was developed as clearly as possible. the state as such, the state as a legal entity, which remains unchanged with the change of rulers. The state becomes independent from the question of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of certain specific carriers of state power. Just as a state war, from an international legal point of view, does not depend on the question of justice or injustice of its cause, so also from constitutional the scope excludes the question of justa causa. From now on, the state becomes the form of existence of any law. "The legitimacy of an institution is not an essential feature of state power," as the German imperial court emphasized for granted on the change of regime and constitution in 1918/19. "Now with all legal clarity to the fore, including in internal affairs, comes independent, different from those or other legitimate and
I read several interesting books and articles on the history of World War II and I think many will be interested.
I will post the most interesting things in my diary.
Territorial changes after World War I
After the First World War, major changes took place in Europe and Asia. Three large empires ceased to exist: Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman.
The following territories departed from Russia: Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, the Caucasus, middle Asia, Far East.
In 1918
Royal Romania occupied Bessarabia. In the summer of the same year, the intervention of the Entente countries began, which ended only in 1922 with the expulsion of the Japanese from Vladivostok.
November 7, 1918 with the assistance of the Soviet government, the Polish Republic was proclaimed, which initially took an anti-Soviet position.
April 25, 1920 Polish troops launched an offensive against Ukraine (Kiev was occupied on May 7). We have to remind that in that war it was not Soviet Russia that acted as the aggressor, but “peaceful Poland.” In June, the Red Army begins a counteroffensive and in early August approaches Warsaw, where it suffers defeat.
October 12, 1920 in Tartu (Estonia) a peace treaty was signed, and on March 18, 1921 - a border treaty. Despite the fact that the Supreme Council of the Allies in 1919 recommended establishing the eastern border of Poland along the "Curzon Line", the Western lands of Ukraine and Belarus were transferred to the Polish state. As a result of the Polish-Lithuanian war (1920), the Vilna (Vilnius) region seceded from Lithuania.
The following states were formed on the territory of Austria-Hungary: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes - later Yugoslavia.
The Ottoman Empire also collapsed. The Middle Eastern lands went to England and France, new states were formed on the territory of the western part of the Arabian Peninsula. Greece also received its share in the division.
Germany suffered the most (and rightly so). She lost her colonies in Africa, Schleswig went to Denmark, Alsace and Lorraine to France, Poland got Poznan and got access to the sea in the area of the free city of Gdansk (Danzig). The left bank of the Rhine was occupied by the Allied forces, and the Saar region came under the control of the League of Nations.
In 1923 the territory of Klaipeda (Memel) passed to Lithuania, which from 1920 to 1923 was under the control of the allies.
First steps towards peace
January 25, 1919. At the Paris Peace Conference, the basic principles for the creation of the League of Nations are put forward. The Charter of the future organization is adopted.
June 28, 1919. German representatives sign a peace treaty (Treaty of Versailles) in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles near Paris.
November 19, 1919. The US Senate votes against the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. USA withdraws from the League of Nations.
January 10, 1920... The ratification of the Treaty of Versailles legitimizes the existence of the League of Nations, which at that time includes twenty-nine states.
August 17, 1920. The Little Entente was formed (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania).
April 16, 1922. A Russian-German treaty was signed in Rappalo. Germany recognizes Soviet Russia as a great power, and both sides renounce mutual demands for payment of reparations, restore diplomatic and trade relations and agree on military cooperation. Two years later, in Berlin, the USSR and Germany signed a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality. In the same year, Great Britain and France declare the recognition of the USSR.
August 8, 1926. Germany is admitted to the League of Nations, a month later Spain leaves this organization.
February 6, 1929. Germany becomes the twenty-third state to approve the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which implies renouncing war as a solution to geopolitical problems. Three days later, the USSR, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Romania signed a similar agreement - the Litvinov Protocol, or the Eastern Pact on the renunciation of war (later to
Turkey and Persia join it).
In September 1934 USSR joins the League of Nations.
In the summer of 1935 the Congress of the Third International declares that in democratic countries the communists will support the governments in the struggle against the fascist states.
The first steps towards war
Europe between the two world wars was a highly unstable entity. The new states that appeared on the map suffered from nationalism and made many of the mistakes typical of young regimes. At the same time, two new ideologies began to show their strength: fascist and communist. Europe was in a fever: regimes were replaced, governments were overthrown, resignations followed one after another. In France, for example, from January 1921 to April 1938, that is, in seventeen years, 23 prime ministers were replaced (!).
Between 1920 and 1936 fascist dictatorships and reactionary regimes were established in the following countries: Hungary (1920), Italy (1922), Bulgaria (1923), Poland (1926), Lithuania (1926), Yugoslavia (1929), Germany (1933), Austria (1933), Portugal (1933), Latvia (1934), Greece (1936).
In January 1921 the offensive of the Greek army in Anatolia (Turkey) began the Greek-Turkish war. It ended on October 13, 1922 with an armistice in the city of Moudania. At this time, the Irish crisis broke out in Ireland with renewed vigor.
July 11, 1931 Norway annexes East Greenland. Denmark is protesting.
In 1933 The League of Nations condemns the actions of Norway.
September 18, 1931 Japan begins an offensive in Manchuria.
In October 1935 Italy unleashes a war against Ethiopia and annexes it on May 9.
Germany on the road to warDespite the fact that the Germans concluded a truce with the Allies on foreign territory, Germany was forced to pay huge reparations.
In April 1921 The Reparations Commission obliges Germany to pay 132 trillion gold marks (£ 6.65 billion) as the country plunged into a long-term economic and political crisis.
For the period from March 1920 to January 1933 in Germany 15 chancellors were replaced.
In October 1923 the deutsche mark exchange rate fell to 10 billion marks per pound sterling.
Finally in 1933 Adolf Hitler becomes Chancellor.
In March 1933 Adopted the Supplementary Powers Act, expanding Hitler's power. In July, all political parties are banned in Germany, except for the Nazi, and on October 14 follows the withdrawal from the League of Nations.
August 1, 1934 President Paul von Hinderburg dies at the age of 87. The "Law on the Supreme Head of the German Empire" is adopted. According to this document, the posts of the president and the chancellor are combined. All military personnel swear allegiance to Adolf Hitler as the Fuehrer (leader) of the German people .. In the same month, at a plebiscite on endowing the Fuehrer with exclusive executive power, 89.9% of Germans vote positively.
October 1, 1934 Hitler gave the order to increase the Reichswehr from 100 thousand to 300 thousand soldiers. At the same time, the Ministry of Propaganda was instructed never to use the term "general staff".
General Keitel called for caution: “Not a single document should be lost, otherwise it will be used by enemy propaganda. Everything that is said orally, we can deny. " Admiral Raeder wrote in his diary:
"The Fuehrer demanded full secrecy in the construction of submarines." Hitler called on science and industry to solve the problem of the two most important types of products, the shortage of which weakened Germany - gasoline and rubber. The production of synthetic fuel reached 300 thousand tons by 1937, and IG Farben began to produce artificial rubber from coal. At the beginning of 1934, plans to mobilize 240 thousand enterprises for the production of military products were approved by the Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council.
The French were in awe at these first signs of a military renaissance for the German colossus; the British believed that gentlemen could be done only by treating them like gentlemen.
In May 1934
British Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon actually proposed to apply the principle of equality of arms to Germany. Hitler waited almost another year before officially dismantling the Versailles system. Goering reported that Germany has an air force on March 10, 1935. On March 16, the German chancellor announced the restoration of
the system of general recruitment into the army and the creation in peacetime of an army of thirty-six divisions (this is about half a million people). That was the end of the Versailles chapter in European history.
In 1935... The German leadership proposed to divide Europe between England and Germany through Phips. The ambassador's reaction led Hitler to report to London that he “did not like Sir Eric Phipps'" appearance "and that bilateral relations would be greatly improved if replaced by a" more modern "diplomat. The new British ambassador, Henderson, was soon called by his colleagues "our Nazi ambassador in Berlin."
March 1, 1935 As a result of a plebiscite, the Saarland becomes part of Germany again.
March 9, 1935 Hitler announced that an air force already existed in Germany, and then the introduction of military
duties and the creation of an army of 36 divisions (550 thousand people). The Fuehrer of the German Reich announced to the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Eden who arrived in Berlin that by arming itself, Germany was rendering a huge service to Europe, protecting it from the evil of Bolshevism.
Then the USSR and France in May 1935 signed an agreement on mutual assistance, the USSR signed the same agreement with Czechoslovakia. The League of Nations verbally condemned the actions of the Germans. Gathering in Stresa, Britain, France and Italy spoke out against German policy, but no action followed. Well, this encouraged Berlin.
March 7, 1936 German troops occupy the demilitarized Rhineland, causing serious concern to France, Belgium and the Soviet Union. The French Foreign Minister is on an urgent flight to London. The British government rejects the offer of forceful opposition. Lord Lothian reassures the French minister: “In
after all, the Germans just crawl into their own backyard. "
At this time, a series of concessions from Great Britain allowed Hitler to create a submarine and surface fleet. Germany is heavily arming itself. In response to the pitiful behavior of its Western allies, Belgium is denouncing the military alliance agreement signed twenty years ago. Now French troops can enter the territory of Belgium only in the event of an attack by Germany.
When did World War II start?
July 17, 1936 in Spain, a military mutiny breaks out, the Civil War begins. In the early days, the rebels were entrenched in Morocco, Balearic Islands and a number of provinces in northern and southwestern Spain.
France invites Britain to pursue a laissez-faire policy. At this time, German and Italian transport aircraft and navy deployed the main forces of the rebels to the continent, supplying them military equipment, weapons and ammunition. In September, a conference is being held in London on the topic Civil war in Spain. 27
countries join the Committee on Non-Intervention, which decided to prohibit the supply of weapons and military materials to Spain and the participation of foreign troops in the war.
Despite this, from the end of October 1936, Germany, Italy, Portugal and a number of other states began open intervention in Spain. According to some reports, up to 50 thousand Germans, 150 thousand Italians and 20 thousand Portuguese fought on the side of General Franco.
The events of the world war turned out to be a difficult test for the peoples. At its final stage, it became obvious that some of the warring states could not withstand the difficulties that befell them. First of all, these were multinational empires: Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman. The burden of war they bore exacerbated social and national contradictions. A long-term exhausting war with external opponents grew into a struggle of peoples against their own rulers. It is known how this happened in Russia. And here is how Austria-Hungary collapsed.Dates and Events
October 16, 1918- the head of the Hungarian government announced the dissolution of the alliance with Austria by Hungary.
28 of October- The National Czechoslovak Committee (established in July 1918) decided to form an independent Czechoslovak state.
29th of October- the National Council was created in Vienna and the independence of German Austria was proclaimed; on the same day, the National Council in Zagreb proclaimed the state independence of the South Slavs of Austria-Hungary.
October 30- in Krakow, the Liquidation Commission was created, which took over the management of the Polish lands, which had previously been part of Austria-Hungary, and proclaimed the belonging of these lands to the reviving Polish state; on the same day, the National Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which were captured by Austria-Hungary in 1908) announced the annexation of both lands to Serbia.
At the final stage of the world war, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire also took place, from which the territories inhabited by non-Turkish peoples separated.
As a result of the fall of multinational empires in Europe, a number of new states emerged. First of all, these were the countries that restored the once lost independence - Poland, Lithuania and others. The revival required significant efforts. At times it was especially difficult to do this. Thus, the "gathering" of Polish lands, previously divided between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia, began during the war, in 1917, and only in November 1918 power passed into the hands of a single provisional government of the Polish Republic. Some of the new states first appeared on the map of Europe in this composition and borders, for example, the Republic of Czechoslovakia, which united two kindred Slavic people- Czechs and Slovaks (proclaimed on October 28, 1918). The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes (proclaimed on December 1, 1918), later named Yugoslavia, became a new multinational state.
The formation of a sovereign state was a turning point in the life of each of the peoples. However, it did not solve all the problems. The legacy of the war was economic devastation and aggravated social contradictions. Revolutionary unrest did not subside after independence.
Paris Peace Conference
On January 18, 1919, a peace conference opened at the Palace of Versailles near Paris. Politicians and diplomats from 32 states had to determine the results of the war, paid for with the blood and sweat of millions of people who fought on the fronts and worked in the rear of the people. Soviet Russia did not receive an invitation to the conference.The main role at the conference belonged to representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, but in reality the main proposals were made by three politicians - US President W. Wilson, British Prime Minister D. Lloyd George and French Prime Minister J. Clemenceau. They represented the conditions of peace in different ways. Wilson back in January 1918 proposed a program for a peaceful settlement and post-war device international life - the so-called "14 points"(on its basis, an armistice was concluded with Germany in November 1918).
The "14 Points" provided for the following: the establishment of a just peace and the rejection of secret diplomacy; freedom of navigation; equality in economic relations between states; arms limitation; settlement of colonial issues taking into account the interests of all peoples; the liberation of the occupied territories and the principles of determining the boundaries of a number of European states; the formation of an independent Polish state, including "all lands inhabited by Poles" and having access to the sea; creation international organization guaranteeing the sovereignty and integrity of all countries.
The program reflected both the aspirations of American diplomacy and the personal views of W. Wilson. Before being elected president, he was a university professor for many years, and if before he tried to familiarize students with the truth and ideals of justice, now - whole nations. Obviously, the author's desire to oppose the “positive democratic program” to the ideas of the Bolsheviks and the foreign policy of Soviet Russia played an important role in the advancement of the “14 points”. In a confidential conversation at that time, he admitted: "The ghost of Bolshevism is lurking everywhere ... All over the world there is a grave concern."
French Prime Minister J. Clemenceau took a different position. Its goals had a practical orientation - to achieve compensation for all losses of France in the war, maximum territorial and monetary compensation, as well as the economic and military weakening of Germany. Clemenceau adhered to the motto "Germany will pay for everything!" For intransigence and fierce defense of his point of view, the conference participants called him the nickname "tiger" that had stuck with him.
The experienced and flexible politician D. Lloyd George tried to balance the positions of the parties and avoid extreme decisions. He wrote: “... it seems to me that we should try to draw up a peace treaty as objective arbiters (judges), forgetting about the passion of war. This treaty should have three goals in mind. First of all, to ensure justice in taking into account Germany's responsibility for the outbreak of the war and for the ways in which it was waged. Secondly, it must be a treaty that a responsible German government can sign with the confidence that it is able to fulfill its assigned obligations. Thirdly, it should be a treaty that will not contain any provocations of the subsequent war and will create an alternative to Bolshevism by offering all reasonable people a real settlement of the European problem ... "
The discussion of the peace terms lasted for almost six months. Behind the scenes of the official work of the commissions and committees, the main decisions were made by the participants " big three"- Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George. They conducted closed consultations and agreements, “forgetting” about “open diplomacy” and other principles proclaimed by W. Wilson. An important event in the course of protracted discussions, a decision was made to create an international organization contributing to the maintenance of peace - League of Nations.
June 28, 1919 in the Hall of Mirrors of the Grand Palace of Versailles, a peace treaty was signed between the allied powers with Germany. Under the terms of the treaty, Germany transferred Alsace and Lorraine to France, the Eupen district, Malmedy - Belgium, the Poznan region and parts of Pomerania and Upper Silesia - Poland, the northern part of Schleswig - Denmark (following a plebiscite). The left bank of the Rhine was occupied by the Entente troops, and on the right bank a demilitarized zone was established. The Saar region came under the control of the League of Nations for 15 years. Danzig (Gdansk) was declared a “free city”, Memel (Klaipeda) seceded from Germany (later included in Lithuania). In total, 1/8 of the territory, on which 1/10 of the country's population lived, was rejected from Germany. In addition, Germany was deprived of colonial possessions, its rights in the Shandong province in China were transferred to Japan. Limits were imposed on the number (no more than 100 thousand people) and armaments of the German army. Germany also had to pay reparations- payment to individual countries for damage caused as a result of the German attack.
Versailles-Washington system
The Versailles Treaty was not limited to solving the German question. It contained provisions on the League of Nations - an organization created for the purpose of settling international disputes and conflicts (the Charter of the League of Nations was also cited here).Later, peace treaties were signed with Germany's former allies - Austria (September 10, 1919), Bulgaria (November 27, 1919), Hungary (June 4, 1920), Turkey (August 10, 1920). They determined the borders of these countries, which were established after the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire and the seizure of part of the territories from them in favor of the victorious powers. For Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, restrictions on the number of armed forces were introduced, and reparations to the winners were provided for. The terms of the treaty with Turkey were particularly tough. She lost all her possessions in Europe, on the Arabian Peninsula, in North Africa... The Turkish armed forces were reduced, it was forbidden to keep the fleet. The area of the Black Sea straits passed under the control of an international commission. This treaty, humiliating for the country, was replaced in 1923, after the victory of the Turkish revolution.
The League of Nations, established in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, took part in the redistribution of colonial possessions. The so-called mandate system, according to which the colonies taken from Germany and its allies under the mandate of the League of Nations were transferred under the tutelage of "advanced" countries, primarily Great Britain and France, which were able to occupy a dominant position in the League of Nations. At the same time, the United States of America, whose president put forward the idea and actively contributed to the creation of the League of Nations, did not join this organization and did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles. This indicated that new system eliminating some contradictions in international relations, gave rise to new ones.
The post-war settlement could not be limited to Europe and the Middle East. Significant problems also existed in Far East, in Southeast Asia and on Pacific... There, the interests of the British, French and new contenders for influence - the United States and Japan, who had previously penetrated the region, clashed, and their rivalry turned out to be especially sharp. To solve the problems, a conference was called in Washington (November 1921 - February 1922). It was attended by representatives of the USA, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Portugal and China. Soviet Russia, whose borders were in this region, did not receive an invitation to the conference this time either.
Several treaties were signed at the Washington Conference. They secured the rights of the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan to the territories they owned in this region (for Japan, this meant the recognition of its rights to the captured possessions of Germany), and established the ratio of the naval forces of individual countries. The question of China was especially considered. On the one hand, the principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity China, and on the other - the provision on "equal opportunities" of the great powers in this country. Thus, the monopoly seizure of China by one of the powers was prevented (a similar threat existed from Japan), but hands were free for the joint exploitation of the wealth of this vast country.
The alignment of forces and mechanisms of international relations in Europe and the world that took shape by the beginning of the 1920s were called Versailles-Washington system.
Old and new in international relations
Since 1920, the Soviet state began to establish relations with neighboring countries by signing peace treaties with Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland. In 1921, agreements on friendship and cooperation were concluded with Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey. They were based on the recognition of the independence of these states, the equality of partners, and in this they differed from the semi-cabal agreements imposed on the countries of the East by the Western powers.At the same time, following the signing of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement (March 1921), the question arose of renewing economic ties Russia with leading European countries. V 1922 year... representatives of Soviet Russia were invited to an international economic conference in Genoa(it opened on April 10). The Soviet delegation was headed by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin. Western powers hoped to gain access to Russian natural resources and the market, as well as find ways of economic and political influence on Russia. The Soviet state was interested in establishing economic ties with the outside world and diplomatic recognition.
The means of pressure on Russia from the West was the demand to pay off the external debts of tsarist Russia and the Provisional Government and compensation for property foreign citizens nationalized by the Bolsheviks. The Soviet country was ready to recognize the pre-war debts of Russia and the right of former foreign owners to receive in concession the property previously owned by them, subject to the legal recognition of the Soviet state and the provision of financial incentives and loans to it. Russia offered to cancel military debts (to declare invalid). At the same time, the Soviet delegation submitted a proposal for a general reduction in armaments. The Western powers did not agree with these proposals. They insisted on the payment by Russia of all debts, including military ones (in the amount of about 19 billion gold rubles), the return of all nationalized property to its former owners, and the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade in the country. The Soviet delegation considered these demands unacceptable and, for its part, proposed that the Western powers compensate for the losses caused to Russia by the intervention and blockade (39 billion gold rubles). The negotiations are at an impasse.
It was not possible to reach a general agreement at the conference. But Soviet diplomats were able to negotiate with representatives of the German delegation in Rapallo (a suburb of Genoa). April 16 was concluded Soviet-German treaty on the resumption of diplomatic relations. Both countries have abandoned claims for damages caused to each other during the war. Germany recognized the nationalization of German property in Russia, while Russia refused to receive reparations from Germany. The treaty came as a surprise to international diplomatic and political circles both because of the very fact of its signing and in terms of its content. Contemporaries noted that he gave the impression of an exploding bomb. It was the success of the diplomats of the two countries and an example for others. It became more and more obvious that the problem of relations with Soviet Russia had become one of the main problems of international politics at that time.
References:
Aleksashkina L. N. / General history... XX - early XXI century.
