Countries of central and eastern Europe in the second half of the 20th century. Abstract on history topic: "Development of Eastern Europe in the second half of the twentieth century"

Eastern Europe: features of the development model. In the countries that have received the name of the people's democratic, the remnants of a multi-party system have survived. Political parties in Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, which recognized the leading role of the communists, were not dissolved, their representatives were allocated a quota in parliaments and governments. Otherwise, in Eastern Europe, the Soviet model of a totalitarian regime was reproduced with its inherent features: the cult of the leader, mass repressions. Collectivization of agriculture was carried out on the Soviet model (Poland was a partial exception) and industrialization.

Formally, the Eastern European countries were considered independent states. At the same time, with the creation of the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties (Informburo) in 1947, the actual leadership of the "fraternal countries" began to be carried out from Moscow. The fact that the USSR will not tolerate any amateur performance was shown by the extremely negative reaction of I.V. Stalin on the policy of the leaders of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia - G. Dimitrov and I. Tito. The Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia included a clause on counteracting "any aggression, from whatever side it comes from." The leaders of these states came up with the idea of creating a confederation of Eastern European countries, which would allow them to independently choose a development model.

The task of modernization was undoubtedly relevant for the Eastern European countries. The communist parties ruling in them tried to solve these problems by socialist methods, copying the experience of modernization in the USSR during the first five-year plans. At the same time, it was not taken into account that in small countries the creation of industry giants is rational only on condition of integration with neighbors. Confederation in Eastern Europe, pooling the resources of Eastern European countries would be economically justified. However, the Soviet leadership saw in this idea a threat to its influence on the countries liberated from fascism.

The Soviet Union responded to attempts to show independence by breaking off relations with Yugoslavia. The Information Bureau called on the Yugoslav communists to overthrow the Tito regime, which was accused of adopting the position of bourgeois nationalism. The transformations in Yugoslavia went the same way as in neighboring countries... Cooperatives were created in agriculture, the economy became the property of the state, the monopoly on power belonged to the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the regime of I. Tito until the death of Stalin was defined as fascist. For all countries of Eastern Europe in 1948-1949. a wave of reprisals swept over those who were suspected of sympathizing with the ideas of the leader of Yugoslavia. In Bulgaria, after the death of G. Dimitrov, a line of hostility towards Tito was also established.

Totalitarian regimes in most Eastern European countries remained fragile. The post-war history of Eastern Europe is full of attempts to free itself from the regimes relying on the support of the USSR, to revise the ideological foundations of socialism. For the population of Eastern European countries, despite the wall of information blockade between the East and West of Europe, it quickly became obvious that the economic policy of the ruling communist regimes is failing completely. Thus, before the Second World War, living standards in West and East Germany, Austria and Hungary were approximately the same. Over time, by the 1980s, in the countries building socialism according to Soviet recipes, the standard of living was three times lower than in neighboring states, where a socially oriented market economy had developed.

The crisis of the Soviet model of socialism in Eastern Europe began to develop almost immediately after its establishment. The death of I.V. Stalin in 1953, which gave rise to hopes for changes in the "socialist camp", caused an uprising in the GDR.

The exposure of Stalin's personality cult by the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 led to the replacement of the leaders of the ruling parties, who were nominated and supported by him, in most Eastern European countries. The liquidation of the Information Bureau and the restoration of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the recognition of the conflict as a misunderstanding gave rise to the hope that the Soviet leadership would give up tight control over domestic politics Eastern European countries. Under these conditions, new leaders, theorists of communist parties, including those in power (M. Djilas in Yugoslavia, L. Kolakovsky in Poland, E. Bloch in the GDR, I. Nagy in Hungary), attempted to comprehend new phenomena and trends in social -economic life of developed countries, the interests of the labor movement. These attempts drew sharp condemnation from the CPSU, which acted as the main defender of the inviolability of the order that had developed in Eastern Europe.

USSR policy towards Eastern European countries. Attempts to dismantle the totalitarian structures of power in Hungary in 1956, the transition to a multi-party system, undertaken by the leadership of the ruling party, grew into an anti-totalitarian, democratic revolution. These aspirations were suppressed by the Soviet troops. An attempt at reforms, the transition to "socialism with a human face", undertaken in Czechoslovakia in 1968, was also thwarted by armed force.

There was no legal justification for the introduction of troops in both cases. The reason was the request of the "group of leaders" for assistance in the fight against "counter-revolution", allegedly sent from outside and threatening the foundations of socialism. Loyalty to the principle of its collective protection has been repeatedly declared by the ruling parties of the USSR and Eastern Europe. However, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the leaders of the ruling party and state raised the question not of rejecting socialism, but of improving it. Those who invited foreign troops to the country were not authorized by anyone. The leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet state has arrogated to itself the right to decide what meets the interests of socialism not only in the USSR, but throughout the world. Under Leonid Brezhnev, the concept of real socialism was formulated, according to which only the understanding of socialism adopted in the USSR had the right to exist. Any deviations from it were seen as a transition to positions hostile to progress and the Soviet Union.

The theory of real socialism, which substantiates the USSR's right to carry out military interventions in the internal affairs of its allies under the Warsaw Pact, was called the "Brezhnev Doctrine" in Western countries. The background to this doctrine was determined by two factors.

First, these were ideological considerations. The recognition of the bankruptcy of socialism in Eastern Europe could raise doubts about the correctness of the course of the CPSU and among the peoples of the USSR.

Second, under the conditions of the Cold War, the split of Europe into two military-political blocs, the weakening of one of them objectively turned out to be a gain for the other. The rupture of allied relations with the USSR by Hungary or Czechoslovakia (this was one of the demands of the reformers) was seen as upsetting the balance of power in Europe. Although in the era of nuclear missiles, the question of where the line of confrontation lies has lost its former significance, the historical memory of invasions from the West has been preserved. It encouraged the Soviet leadership to strive to ensure that the troops of a potential enemy, which the NATO bloc was considered to be, were deployed as far as possible from the borders of the USSR. At the same time, they underestimated the fact that many East Europeans felt they were hostages of the Soviet-American confrontation, realizing that in the event of a serious conflict between the USSR and the United States, the territory of Eastern Europe would become the main battleground for interests alien to them.

Deepening of the crisis of "real socialism". In the 1970s. in many countries of Eastern Europe, reforms were gradually carried out, limited opportunities for the development of free market relations opened up, trade and economic ties with states were intensified Western Europe, repression against dissidents was limited. In particular, an independent, non-partisan pacifist movement emerged in Hungary. The changes, however, were of a limited nature and were carried out with an eye on the position of the USSR leadership, which disapproved of them.

The most far-sighted leaders of the ruling parties in Eastern European countries sought to maintain at least minimal domestic support and the need to reckon with the tough, intolerant of any reforms in allied countries the position of the ideologists of the CPSU.

The events in Poland in 1980-1981 became a kind of turning point, where the independent trade union "Solidarity" was formed, which immediately took an anti-communist position. Its members were millions of representatives of the working class of Poland, who rejected the right of the communist bureaucracy to rule on its behalf. In this situation, the USSR and its allies did not dare to use troops to suppress dissent. Martial law was introduced in Poland and the authoritarian rule of General W. Jaruzelski was established. This marked the complete collapse of the idea of "real socialism", which was forcedly replaced, with the approval of the USSR, by a military dictatorship.

DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS

From the memoirs of M. Djilas, a member of the Central Committee of the SKYU, in the collection: “Russia, which we did not know, 1939-1993”. M., 1995.S. 222-223:

“Stalin pursued two goals. The first is to subjugate Yugoslavia and through it all of Eastern Europe. There was another option as well. If it does not work out with Yugoslavia, then subjugate Eastern Europe without it. He got the second one<...>

This has not been written anywhere, but I remember from confidential conversations that in the countries of Eastern Europe - Poland, Romania, Hungary - there was a tendency towards independent development<...>In 1946 I attended the congress of the Czechoslovak Party in Prague. There Gottwald said that the level of culture of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union is different. He emphasized that Czechoslovakia is an industrially developed country and socialism in it will develop differently, in more civilized forms, without the upheavals that were in the Soviet Union, where industrialization was going through very difficult stages. Gottwald opposed collectivization in Czechoslovakia. In fact, his views were not very different from ours. Gottwald lacked the character to fight Stalin. And Tito was a strong man<...>Gomulka also failed to defend his position. At one meeting of the Information Bureau, Gomulka spoke about the Polish path to socialism. Dimitrov also thought about independent development. "

From the statement of N.S. Khrushchev on May 26, 1955 in the collection: "Russia, which we did not know, 1939-1993". M., 1995.S. 221:

“We sincerely regret what happened, and resolutely reject all the layers of this period.<...>We have thoroughly studied the materials on which the grave accusations and insults were based then against the leadership of Yugoslavia. The facts show that these materials were fabricated by the enemies of the people, despicable agents of imperialism, who fraudulently infiltrated the ranks of our party.

We are deeply convinced that the period when our relationship was darkened is behind us. "

From the memoirs of Z. Mlynarzh, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, "Frost hit from the Kremlin." M., 1992.S. 130:

“The years of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia only strengthened in the national consciousness those ideals that the authorities tried in every possible way to eradicate. The dictatorship clearly showed what their oblivion leads to, and this pushed even “ideologically convinced” Stalinists on the path of reforms. In the minds of the peoples, the values of democracy and humanism were rehabilitated long before 1968<...>To live in fear, acting on orders, and not as in the depths of your soul you think is right, worthy, a heavy burden for the individual, and for the social group, and for the entire people. Therefore, getting rid of such fear is welcomed as resurrection. "

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

1. What factors determined the choice of the development model for the states of Eastern Europe after the Second World War? What was common and what distinguished the post-war development of these countries?

2. What are the events of the 1940-1980s. showed the instability of the political regimes of the Eastern European states?

3. What was the “Brezhnev doctrine”, what was its main ideological and political meaning?

The Soviet Union responded to attempts to show independence by breaking off relations with Yugoslavia. The Information Bureau called on the Yugoslav communists to overthrow the Tito regime, which was accused of adopting the position of bourgeois nationalism. The transformations in Yugoslavia went the same way as in neighboring countries. Cooperatives were created in agriculture, the economy became the property of the state, the monopoly on power belonged to the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the regime of I. Tito until the death of Stalin was defined as fascist. For all countries of Eastern Europe in 1948-1949. a wave of reprisals swept over those who were suspected of sympathizing with the ideas of the leader of Yugoslavia. In Bulgaria, after the death of G. Dimitrov, a line of hostility towards Tito was also established.

The exposure of Stalin's personality cult by the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 led to the replacement of the leaders of the ruling parties, who were nominated and supported by him, in most Eastern European countries. The liquidation of the Information Bureau and the restoration of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the recognition of the conflict as a misunderstanding gave rise to the hope that the Soviet leadership would give up tight control over the internal politics of Eastern European countries. Under these conditions, new leaders, theorists of communist parties, including those in power (M. Djilas in Yugoslavia, L. Kolakovsky in Poland, E. Bloch in the GDR, I. Nagy in Hungary), attempted to comprehend new phenomena and trends in social -economic life of developed countries, the interests of the labor movement. These attempts drew sharp condemnation from the CPSU, which acted as the main defender of the inviolability of the order that had developed in Eastern Europe.

Deepening of the crisis of "real socialism". In the 1970s. In many countries of Eastern Europe, reforms were gradually carried out, limited opportunities for the development of free market relations were opened, trade and economic ties with the states of Western Europe were intensified, and repression against dissidents was limited. In particular, an independent, non-partisan pacifist movement emerged in Hungary. The changes, however, were limited in nature and were carried out with an eye on the position of the USSR leadership, which disapproved of them.

The most far-sighted leaders of the ruling parties in Eastern European countries strove to maintain at least minimal internal support and the need to reckon with the tough position of the CPSU ideologists intolerant of any reforms in the allied countries.

DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS

From the memoirs of M. Djilas, a member of the Central Committee of the SKYU, in the collection: “Russia, which we did not know, 1939-1993”. M., 1995.S. 222-223:

From the statement of N.S. Khrushchev on May 26, 1955 in the collection: "Russia, which we did not know, 1939-1993". M., 1995.S. 221:

We are deeply convinced that the period when our relationship was darkened is behind us. "

From the memoirs of Z. Mlynarzh, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, "Frost hit from the Kremlin." M., 1992.S. 130:

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

2. What are the events of the 1940-1980s. showed the instability of the political regimes of the Eastern European states?

3. What was the “Brezhnev doctrine”, what was its main ideological and political meaning?

on history

topic: "Development of Eastern Europe in the second half of the twentieth century."

Completed:

1. Introduction. 1

2 Totalitarian socialism. 2

3 Revolutions in Eastern Europe, 7

collapse of the USSR, the formation of new states

in Eurasia.

4 China. eleven

Introduction.

This chapter will focus on the countries that entered the Soviet bloc at the beginning of the Cold War. A socio-political system was created in them, largely copied from the USSR. These countries are very different. Among them, China is the most populated country in the world and tiny Albania, developed Czechoslovakia and backward Laos. Most of them were compactly located to the west of the USSR: from the Baltic to the Black and Adriatic Seas - the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania. Others in Asia are Mongolia, China, North Korea (DPRK), Laos and Vietnam. Finally, it is the Latin American state of Cuba.

Totalitarian socialism.

Eastern Europe after World War II . The formation of totalitarian socialism in these countries followed different paths. In the countries of Eastern Europe, the defeat of fascism led to the restoration of independence where it was lost, or a change in the political regime where it was preserved. A democratic system, universal suffrage and a multi-party system were established everywhere, agrarian reforms were carried out, which destroyed large landholdings, and the property of traitors and active supporters of fascism was confiscated.

The development of events in the West and in the East of Europe was very similar in the first post-war years. The difference was that Eastern Europe was liberated by the Soviet Army, and the role of the communist parties there was much more significant. Firstly, because in some of them (Yugoslavia, Albania) the communist parties led the partisan movement and, relying on it, became the most influential political force; secondly, because they enjoyed the support of the USSR, under its pressure the communists became part of all post-war governments of these countries, occupying, as a rule, “power” ministerial posts. When the Cold War began, relying on the positions they had already won and direct pressure from Moscow, the communists relatively easily and bloodlessly established their undivided power in 1947-1948.

Countries of Asia. The communists in North Korea also came to power in about the same way. In Mongolia, China, Vietnam and Laos, the coming of the communists to power, although it was associated with the support of the USSR, but to a lesser extent. To a much greater extent, this was due to that. That the communists in these countries led the liberation, anti-colonial movement. Thanks to this, they became an influential political force and were able to come to power.

Changes in the political system . Having come to power, the Communist Parties set about "building socialism." The experience of the USSR was taken as a role model. The political system was transformed. The multiparty system was either liquidated, or the parties lost political independence, becoming part of the coalitions and fronts led by the communists. All power was concentrated in the hands of the Communist Parties. The judicial and representative powers lost their independence. Following the example of the USSR, massive repressions were carried out. All rights and freedoms of citizens have been virtually abolished. Democracy was done away with, although constitutions, universal suffrage were formally preserved, “elections” were held regularly, and the leaders of these countries proudly called them countries of “people's democracies”.

Planned Economy . In the field of economics, "building socialism" meant the completion of the nationalization of industry and finance, industrialization, and the cooperation of agriculture. The market economy gave way to a planned one. A large-scale breakdown of economic and social structures took place. Entrepreneurs and independent peasants disappeared. Most of the adult population was employed in the public sector of the economy.

Foreign policy . In foreign policy all these countries, to a greater or lesser extent, followed the course of the USSR. Any disobedience to Moscow provoked a very harsh reaction at first. As evidenced by the Tito-Stalin conflict.

Results of socialist transformations ... As a result, the social and political system in these countries was decisively transformed. And just as we call similar processes in Russia after October 1917 a revolution, we have the right to call these transformations revolutionary too. These revolutions were socialist, in the sense that they established state property instead of private property. They led to the formation of a totalitarian political system in these countries. All this allows us to call these countries the countries of totalitarian socialism.

Political crises. Stalin's death in 1953 brought about major changes. Liberation from the oppressive fear of him exposed the deep contradictions of totalitarian socialism and mass dissatisfaction with it. In the GDR, and then in Poland and Hungary, political crises arose, overcoming which it turned out to be impossible without the use of force.

Policy changes ... In a number of Eastern European countries, Communist Parties have been forced to change policies to address the root causes of discontent. Mass repressions were stopped and their victims were partially rehabilitated, changes were made to the planned rates of industrialization, the forms of cooperation were softened, and in Poland it was stopped. Restrictions for small businesses were partially lifted. Later, economic reforms were carried out that weakened the tight, administrative control over the economy. In many countries, all this was accompanied by a "thaw" in the field of ideology and culture.

In other countries, criticism of the most unattractive aspects of the Stalinist regime in the USSR has caused alarm. The ruling leaders were worried about the possibility of criticism being transferred to them. They not only did not support the changes in Moscow and some Eastern European countries, but also tried to take their own position. The first signs of Soviet-Chinese contradictions appear. In the early 60s, Romania and North Korea increasingly declared their independence. Albania breaks ties with the USSR.

But. The changes in the USSR and some countries of Eastern Europe, which took place after Stalin's death, turned out to be shallow. Totalitarian socialism was not eliminated there, but only softened in order to make it more acceptable to the masses. But even this weakening of the regimes after a while began to be viewed by the communist parties as a dangerous concession. The events in Czechoslovakia became a vivid proof of this danger for them.

Strengthening totalitarianism . After the intervention in Czechoslovakia, all the countries of Eastern Europe that survived attempts to renew socialism began to tighten the totalitarian features of their system. Economic reforms were stopped. Backward movement began. The elements of market relations that had arisen in some places were eliminated or limited. All the disaffected began to be persecuted. In many countries, this has resulted in a movement of human rights defenders, “dissidents”.

The strengthening of totalitarianism began in countries where there were no attempts at reform and renewal. There totalitarianism took on especially extreme forms. In Albania, for example, all religions were banned in the 1960s. In China, they tried to "build communism": the cooperatives were turned into communes, the peasants were taken away household plots and personal property. In these countries, cults of personalities of leaders have developed: Kim Il Sung in North Korea, Mao Zedong in China, Enver Hoxha in Albania, Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania. All citizens were required to comply with their instructions unquestioningly.

Deterioration economic situation . However, the economic situation in the countries of totalitarian socialism, starting from the 70s, began to deteriorate steadily. Many Eastern European countries began to take loans from Western countries trying to use these funds to renew the industry and accelerate development. But as a result, the problem of external debt arose. I had to pay my debts. This made their situation even worse. Renewed after the death of Mao Zedong, the Chinese leadership was forced to make a decision to start market reforms in 1978 in order to overcome difficulties. In the countries of Eastern Europe, they did not even think about reforms. The economic situation there became more and more complicated. Conditions for the revolution began to take shape here.

Revolutions in the countries of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the USSR, the formation of new states in Eurasia.

Social problems. The deterioration of the economic situation in the countries of Eastern Europe led, ultimately, to the manifestation of social problems. Unemployment has arisen, overt or latent inflation has depreciated wages, food supply has worsened. Those features of the way of life that had become entrenched in the mass consciousness as the “conquest of socialism” began to disappear: the absence of unemployment, social stability, and fixed prices. Totalitarian socialism has exhausted its last arguments in its defense as a more “advanced” system. The old ways have become ineffective, without which the existence of a totalitarian society is impossible.

Disappointment and discontent took many forms. The population of the GDR preferred to leave for the FRG, which took on massive forms, despite the repressions of the authorities and total surveillance. In Poland, discontent turned into a strike movement. In 1980, in the course of strikes, the independent trade union Solidarity was formed, headed by an electrician from the Gdansk shipyard, Lech Walesa. Solidarity has absorbed almost all opposition forces and turned into a mass organization: its number reached 10-11 million people. The government was forced to enter into negotiations with her. A serious challenge was thrown down to the authorities ... bound hand and foot by participation in the Afghan adventure, the Soviet leadership did not find it possible to directly intervene in the events. But it exerted a powerful influence on the Polish leadership, demanding the prohibition of Solidarity. In December 1981, martial law was introduced in the country. All Solidarity leaders were arrested, and the union itself was disbanded. But the military government of Poland could not find a way out of this situation. The decline in production continued. Solidarity retained massive support. Her illegal organizations continued to function.

EASTERN EUROPE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE XX CENTURY

Parameter name	Meaning
Topic of the article:	EASTERN EUROPE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE XX CENTURY
Rubric (thematic category)	History

Chapter 12. USSR AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Most of the states of Eastern Europe - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary - appeared on political map the world after the first world war. Being mainly agrarian and agrarian-industrial, having territorial claims to each other, in the interwar period they became hostages of the relationship of the great powers, a bargaining chip in their confrontation. Ultimately, in the role of satellites, junior partners, occupied protectorates, they were subordinated to Nazi Germany.

The subordinate, dependent nature of the situation in Eastern Europe did not change after the Second World War.

Formally, the Eastern European countries were considered independent states. At the same time, with the creation of the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties (Informburo) in 1947 ᴦ. the actual leadership of the "brotherly countries" began to be carried out from Moscow. The fact that the USSR will not tolerate any amateur performance was shown by the extremely negative reaction of I.V. Stalin on the policy of the leaders of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia - G. Dimitrov and I. Tito. The Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia included a clause on counteracting “any aggression, from whatever side it came from”. The leaders of these states came up with the idea of creating a confederation of Eastern European countries, which would allow them to independently choose a development model.

The task of modernization was undoubtedly relevant for the Eastern European countries. The communist parties ruling in them tried to solve these problems by socialist methods, copying the experience of modernization in the USSR during the first five-year plans. At the same time, it was not taken into account that in small countries the creation of industry giants is rational only on condition of integration with neighbors. Confederation in Eastern Europe, pooling the resources of Eastern European countries would be economically justified. At the same time, the Soviet leadership saw in this idea a threat to its influence on the countries liberated from fascism.

The Soviet Union responded to attempts to show independence by breaking off relations with Yugoslavia. The Information Bureau called on the Yugoslav communists to overthrow the Tito regime, which was accused of adopting the position of bourgeois nationalism. The transformations in Yugoslavia proceeded in the same way as in the neighboring countries. Cooperatives were created in agriculture, the economy became the property of the state, the monopoly on power belonged to the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the regime of I. Tito until the death of Stalin was defined as fascist. Across all countries of Eastern Europe in 1948-1949. a wave of reprisals swept over those who were suspected of sympathizing with the ideas of the leader of Yugoslavia. In Bulgaria, after the death of G. Dimitrov, a line of hostility towards Tito was also established.

Totalitarian regimes in most Eastern European countries remained fragile. The post-war history of Eastern Europe is full of attempts to free itself from the regimes relying on the support of the USSR, to revise the ideological foundations of socialism. It should be said that for the population of Eastern European countries, despite the wall of information blockade between the East and West of Europe, it quickly became obvious that the economic policy of the ruling communist regimes is failing completely. Thus, before the Second World War, living standards in West and East Germany, Austria and Hungary were approximately the same. Over time, by the 1980s, in the countries building socialism according to Soviet recipes, the standard of living was three times lower than in neighboring states, where a socially oriented market economy had developed.

Exposure of Stalin's personality cult by the XX Congress of the CPSU in 1956 ᴦ. led to a change in the ruling parties, nominated and supported by them, in most Eastern European countries. The liquidation of the Information Bureau and the restoration of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the recognition of the conflict as a misunderstanding gave rise to the hope that the Soviet leadership would give up tight control over the internal politics of Eastern European countries. In these conditions, the new leaders, theorists of the communist parties, incl. and the ruling (M. Djilas in Yugoslavia, L. Kolakovsky in Poland, E. Bloch in the GDR, I. Nagy in Hungary), attempted to comprehend new phenomena and trends in the socio-economic life of developed countries, the interests of the labor movement. These attempts drew sharp condemnation from the CPSU, which acted as the main defender of the inviolability of the order that had developed in Eastern Europe.

USSR policy towards Eastern European countries. Attempts to dismantle the totalitarian power structures in Hungary in 1956, the transition to a multi-party system, undertaken by the leadership of the ruling party, grew into an anti-totalitarian, democratic revolution. These aspirations were suppressed by the Soviet troops. An attempt at reforms, a transition to "socialism with a human face", undertaken in Czechoslovakia in 1968, was also thwarted by armed force.

There was no legal justification for the introduction of troops in both cases. The reason was the request of the "group of leaders" for assistance in the fight against "counterrevolution", allegedly sent from outside and threatening the foundations of socialism. Loyalty to the principle of its collective protection has been repeatedly declared by the ruling parties of the USSR and Eastern Europe. Moreover, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 ᴦ. the leaders of the ruling party and the state raised the question not of rejecting socialism, but of improving it. Those who invited foreign troops to the country were not authorized by anyone. The leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet state has arrogated to itself the right to decide what meets the interests of socialism not only in the USSR, but throughout the world. Under Leonid Brezhnev, the concept of real socialism was formulated, according to which only the understanding of socialism adopted in the USSR had the right to exist. Any deviations from it were seen as a transition to positions hostile to progress and the Soviet Union.

The theory of real socialism, which substantiates the USSR's right to carry out military intervention in the internal affairs of its allies under the Warsaw Pact, was called the Brezhnev Doctrine in Western countries. The background to this doctrine was determined by two factors.

First of all, these were ideological considerations. The recognition of the bankruptcy of socialism in Eastern Europe could raise doubts about the correctness of the course of the CPSU and among the peoples of the USSR.

Secondly, in the conditions of the Cold War, the split of Europe into two military-political blocs, the weakening of one of them objectively turned out to be a gain for the other. The rupture of allied relations with the USSR by Hungary or Czechoslovakia (this was one of the demands of the reformers) was seen as upsetting the balance of power in Europe. Although in the era of nuclear missiles, the question of where the line of confrontation lies has lost its former significance, the historical memory of invasions from the West has been preserved. It encouraged the Soviet leadership to strive to ensure that the troops of a potential enemy, which the NATO bloc was considered to be, were deployed as far as possible from the borders of the USSR. At the same time, they underestimated the fact that many East Europeans felt they were hostages of the Soviet-American confrontation, realizing that in the event of a serious conflict between the USSR and the United States, the territory of Eastern Europe would become the main battleground for interests alien to them.

The most far-sighted leaders of the ruling parties in Eastern European countries strove to maintain at least minimal internal support and it is extremely important to reckon with the tough, intolerant of any reforms in the allied countries, the position of the ideologues of the CPSU.

A kind of turning point was the events in Poland in 1980-1981, where the independent trade union “Solidarity” was formed, which immediately took an anti-communist position. Millions of the working class of Poland became its members, who rejected the right of the communist bureaucracy to rule on its behalf. In this situation, the USSR and its allies did not dare to use troops to suppress dissent. Martial law was introduced in Poland and the authoritarian rule of General W. Jaruzelski was established. This marked the complete collapse of the idea of "real socialism", which was forcedly replaced, with the approval of the USSR, by a military dictatorship.

DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS

From the memoirs of M. Djilas, a member of the Central Committee of the SKYU, in the collection: "Russia, which we did not know, 1939-1993". M., 1995.S. 222-223:

ʼʼStalin pursued two goals. The first is to subjugate Yugoslavia and through it all of Eastern Europe. There was another option as well. If it does not work out with Yugoslavia, then subjugate Eastern Europe without it. He got the second one<...>

This has not been written anywhere, but I remember from confidential conversations that in the countries of Eastern Europe - Poland, Romania, Hungary - there was a tendency towards independent development<...>In 1946 ᴦ. I was at the Congress of the Czechoslovak Party in Prague. There Gottwald said that the level of culture of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union is different. He emphasized that Czechoslovakia is an industrially developed country and socialism in it will develop differently, in more civilized forms, without the upheavals that were in the Soviet Union, where industrialization was going through very difficult stages. Gottwald opposed collectivization in Czechoslovakia. In fact, his views were not very different from ours. Gottwald lacked the character to fight Stalin. And Tito was a strong man<...>Gomulka also failed to defend his position. At one meeting of the Information Bureau, Gomulka spoke about the Polish path to socialism. Dimitrov also thought about independent developmentʼʼ.

From the statement of N.S. Khrushchev May 26, 1955 ᴦ. in the collection: "Russia, which we did not know, 1939-1993". M., 1995.S. 221:

ʼʼWe sincerely regret what happened, and resolutely reject all the layers of this period<...>We have thoroughly studied the materials on which the grave accusations and insults were based then against the leadership of Yugoslavia. The facts show that these materials were fabricated by the enemies of the people, despicable agents of imperialism, who fraudulently infiltrated the ranks of our party.

We are deeply convinced that the period when our relationship was darkened is over. ”

From the memoirs of Z. Mlynarzh, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, "Moroz hit from the Kremlin". M., 1992.S. 130:

ʼʼThe years of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia only strengthened in the national consciousness those ideals that the authorities tried in every possible way to eradicate. The dictatorship clearly showed what their oblivion leads to, and this pushed even the "ideally convinced" Stalinists on the path of reforms. In the minds of the peoples, the values of democracy and humanism were rehabilitated long before 1968<...>To live in fear, acting on orders, and not as in the depths of the soul you think is right, worthy, a heavy burden both for an individual, and for a social group, and for all people. For this reason, getting rid of such fear is welcomed as resurrection. ”

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

2. What are the events of the 1940-1980s. showed the instability of the political regimes of the Eastern European states?

3. What was the "Brezhnev doctrine", what was its main ideological, political meaning?

EASTERN EUROPE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE XX CENTURY - concept and types. Classification and features of the category "EASTERN EUROPE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE XX CENTURY" 2014, 2015.

Zagladin N. The World History: XX century. Textbook for schoolchildren of grades 10-11

Chapter 12. USSR AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

According to the views of many geopoliticians, due to its population, abundance of resources, a fairly high level of economic development, the territory from the Rhine to the Urals is the "heart of the Earth", control over which ensures hegemony over Eurasia, and, accordingly, the world. Eastern Europe is the center of the "heart of the Earth", which determines its special significance. Indeed, historically, Eastern Europe has been a battlefield of powers and an arena for the interaction of various cultures. In past centuries, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, Germany, and Russia claimed dominion over it. There were also attempts to create strong West Slavic states, the largest state formation of which was Poland, which in the 18th-19th centuries was divided between Russia, Austria and Prussia.
Most of the states of Eastern Europe - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary - appeared on the political map of the world after the First World War. Being mainly agrarian and agrarian-industrial, having territorial claims to each other, in the interwar period they became hostages of the relationship of the great powers, a bargaining chip in their confrontation. Ultimately, in the role of satellites, junior partners, occupied protectorates, they were subordinated to Nazi Germany.
The subordinate, dependent nature of the situation in Eastern Europe did not change after the Second World War.

Section 38. EASTERN EUROPE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE XX CENTURY

With the defeat of fascism, coalition governments came to power in Eastern European countries, in which anti-fascist parties were represented (communists, social democrats, liberals, etc.). The first transformations were of a general democratic nature, were aimed at eradicating the remnants of fascism, restoring the economy destroyed by the war. With the aggravation of contradictions between the USSR and its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, the United States and Great Britain, the beginning of the Cold War in the countries of Eastern Europe, there was a polarization of political forces towards supporters of a pro-Western and pro-Soviet orientation. In the 1947-1948s. in these countries, most of which were Soviet troops, all who did not share the communist views were ousted from the governments.
Eastern Europe: features of the development model. In the countries that have received the name of the people's democratic, the remnants of a multi-party system have survived. Political parties in Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, which recognized the leading role of the communists, were not dissolved, their representatives were allocated a quota in parliaments and governments. Otherwise, in Eastern Europe, the Soviet model of a totalitarian regime was reproduced with its inherent features: the cult of the leader, mass repressions. Collectivization of agriculture was carried out on the Soviet model (Poland was a partial exception) and industrialization.
Formally, the Eastern European countries were considered independent states. At the same time, with the creation of the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties (Informburo) in 1947, the actual leadership of the "fraternal countries" began to be carried out from Moscow. The fact that the USSR will not tolerate any amateur performance was shown by the extremely negative reaction of I.V. Stalin on the policy of the leaders of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia - G. Dimitrov and I. Tito. The Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia included a clause on counteracting "any aggression, from whatever side it comes from." The leaders of these states came up with the idea of creating a confederation of Eastern European countries, which would allow them to independently choose a development model.
The task of modernization was undoubtedly relevant for the Eastern European countries. The communist parties ruling in them tried to solve these problems by socialist methods, copying the experience of modernization in the USSR during the first five-year plans. At the same time, it was not taken into account that in small countries the creation of industry giants is rational only on condition of integration with neighbors. Confederation in Eastern Europe, pooling the resources of Eastern European countries would be economically justified. However, the Soviet leadership saw in this idea a threat to its influence on the countries liberated from fascism.
The Soviet Union responded to attempts to show independence by breaking off relations with Yugoslavia. The Information Bureau called on the Yugoslav communists to overthrow the Tito regime, which was accused of adopting the position of bourgeois nationalism. The transformations in Yugoslavia went the same way as in neighboring countries. Cooperatives were created in agriculture, the economy became the property of the state, the monopoly on power belonged to the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the regime of I. Tito until the death of Stalin was defined as fascist. For all countries of Eastern Europe in 1948-1949. a wave of reprisals swept over those who were suspected of sympathizing with the ideas of the leader of Yugoslavia. In Bulgaria, after the death of G. Dimitrov, a line of hostility towards Tito was also established.
Totalitarian regimes in most Eastern European countries remained fragile. The post-war history of Eastern Europe is full of attempts to free itself from the regimes relying on the support of the USSR, to revise the ideological foundations of socialism. For the population of Eastern European countries, despite the wall of information blockade between the East and West of Europe, it quickly became obvious that the economic policy of the ruling communist regimes is failing completely. Thus, before the Second World War, living standards in West and East Germany, Austria and Hungary were approximately the same. Over time, by the 1980s, in the countries building socialism according to Soviet recipes, the standard of living was three times lower than in neighboring states, where a socially oriented market economy had developed.
The crisis of the Soviet model of socialism in Eastern Europe began to develop almost immediately after its establishment. The death of I.V. Stalin in 1953, which gave rise to hopes for changes in the "socialist camp", caused an uprising in the GDR.
The exposure of Stalin's personality cult by the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 led to the replacement of the leaders of the ruling parties, who were nominated and supported by him, in most Eastern European countries. The liquidation of the Information Bureau and the restoration of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the recognition of the conflict as a misunderstanding gave rise to the hope that the Soviet leadership would give up tight control over the internal politics of Eastern European countries. Under these conditions, new leaders, theorists of communist parties, including those in power (M. Djilas in Yugoslavia, L. Kolakovsky in Poland, E. Bloch in the GDR, I. Nagy in Hungary), attempted to comprehend new phenomena and trends in social -economic life of developed countries, the interests of the labor movement. These attempts drew sharp condemnation from the CPSU, which acted as the main defender of the inviolability of the order that had developed in Eastern Europe.
USSR policy towards Eastern European countries. Attempts to dismantle the totalitarian structures of power in Hungary in 1956, the transition to a multi-party system, undertaken by the leadership of the ruling party, grew into an anti-totalitarian, democratic revolution. These aspirations were suppressed by the Soviet troops. An attempt at reforms, the transition to "socialism with a human face", undertaken in Czechoslovakia in 1968, was also thwarted by armed force.
There was no legal justification for the introduction of troops in both cases. The reason was the request of the "group of leaders" for assistance in the fight against "counter-revolution", allegedly sent from outside and threatening the foundations of socialism. Loyalty to the principle of its collective protection has been repeatedly declared by the ruling parties of the USSR and Eastern Europe. However, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the leaders of the ruling party and state raised the question not of rejecting socialism, but of improving it. Those who invited foreign troops to the country were not authorized by anyone. The leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet state has arrogated to itself the right to decide what meets the interests of socialism not only in the USSR, but throughout the world. Under Leonid Brezhnev, the concept of real socialism was formulated, according to which only the understanding of socialism adopted in the USSR had the right to exist. Any deviations from it were seen as a transition to positions hostile to progress and the Soviet Union.
The theory of real socialism, which substantiates the USSR's right to carry out military interventions in the internal affairs of its allies under the Warsaw Pact, was called the "Brezhnev Doctrine" in Western countries. The background to this doctrine was determined by two factors.
First, these were ideological considerations. The recognition of the bankruptcy of socialism in Eastern Europe could raise doubts about the correctness of the course of the CPSU and among the peoples of the USSR.
Second, under the conditions of the Cold War, the split of Europe into two military-political blocs, the weakening of one of them objectively turned out to be a gain for the other. The rupture of allied relations with the USSR by Hungary or Czechoslovakia (this was one of the demands of the reformers) was seen as upsetting the balance of power in Europe. Although in the era of nuclear missiles, the question of where the line of confrontation lies has lost its former significance, the historical memory of invasions from the West has been preserved. It encouraged the Soviet leadership to strive to ensure that the troops of a potential enemy, which the NATO bloc was considered to be, were deployed as far as possible from the borders of the USSR. At the same time, they underestimated the fact that many East Europeans felt they were hostages of the Soviet-American confrontation, realizing that in the event of a serious conflict between the USSR and the United States, the territory of Eastern Europe would become the main battleground for interests alien to them.
Deepening of the crisis of "real socialism". In the 1970s. In many countries of Eastern Europe, reforms were gradually carried out, limited opportunities for the development of free market relations were opened, trade and economic ties with the states of Western Europe were intensified, and repression against dissidents was limited. In particular, an independent, non-partisan pacifist movement emerged in Hungary. The changes, however, were limited in nature and were carried out with an eye on the position of the USSR leadership, which disapproved of them.
The most far-sighted leaders of the ruling parties in Eastern European countries strove to maintain at least minimal internal support and the need to reckon with the tough position of the CPSU ideologists intolerant of any reforms in the allied countries.
The events in Poland in 1980-1981 became a kind of turning point, where the independent trade union "Solidarity" was formed, which immediately took an anti-communist position. Its members were millions of representatives of the working class of Poland, who rejected the right of the communist bureaucracy to rule on its behalf. In this situation, the USSR and its allies did not dare to use troops to suppress dissent. Martial law was introduced in Poland and the authoritarian rule of General W. Jaruzelski was established. This marked the complete collapse of the idea of "real socialism", which was forcedly replaced, with the approval of the USSR, by a military dictatorship.
DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS
FrommemoriesM... Jilas, memberCCSKU, vcollection: "Russiawhichwenotknew, 1939— 1993 "... M., 1995.. 222-223:
“Stalin pursued two goals. The first is to subjugate Yugoslavia and through it all of Eastern Europe. There was another option as well. If it does not work out with Yugoslavia, then subjugate Eastern Europe without it. He got the second one<...>
This has not been written anywhere, but I remember from confidential conversations that in the countries of Eastern Europe - Poland, Romania, Hungary - there was a tendency towards independent development<...>In 1946 I attended the congress of the Czechoslovak Party in Prague. There Gottwald said that the level of culture of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union is different. He emphasized that Czechoslovakia is an industrially developed country and socialism in it will develop differently, in more civilized forms, without the upheavals that were in the Soviet Union, where industrialization was going through very difficult stages. Gottwald opposed collectivization in Czechoslovakia. In fact, his views were not very different from ours. Gottwald lacked the character to fight Stalin. And Tito was a strong man<...>Gomulka also failed to defend his position. At one meeting of the Information Bureau, Gomulka spoke about the Polish path to socialism. Dimitrov also thought about independent development. "
FromstatementsH.WITH... Khrushchev26 of May1955 incollection: "Russiawhichwenotknew, 1939— 1993 "... M., 1995.. 221:
“We sincerely regret what happened, and resolutely reject all the layers of this period.<...>We have thoroughly studied the materials on which the grave accusations and insults were based then against the leadership of Yugoslavia. The facts show that these materials were fabricated by the enemies of the people, despicable agents of imperialism, who fraudulently infiltrated the ranks of our party.
We are deeply convinced that the period when our relationship was darkened is behind us. "
Frommemories3. Mlynarza, memberCCHRC, "FreezinghitfromKremlin "... M., 1992.. 130:
“The years of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia only strengthened in the national consciousness those ideals that the authorities tried in every possible way to eradicate. The dictatorship clearly showed what their oblivion leads to, and this pushed even “ideologically convinced” Stalinists on the path of reforms. In the minds of the peoples, the values of democracy and humanism were rehabilitated long before 1968<...>To live in fear, acting on orders, and not as in the depths of your soul you think is right, worthy, a heavy burden for the individual, and for the social group, and for the entire people. Therefore, getting rid of such fear is welcomed as resurrection. "

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS
1. What factors determined the choice of the development model for the states of Eastern Europe after the Second World War? What was common and what distinguished the post-war development of these countries?
2. What are the events of the 1940-1980s. showed the instability of the political regimes of the Eastern European states?
3. What was the “Brezhnev doctrine”, what was its main ideological and political meaning?

§ 39. REASONS OF THE CRISIS OF TOTALITARY SOCIALISM IN THE USSR

The 20th century witnessed not only the rise, but also the decline of totalitarianism, the collapse of totalitarian political regimes in many countries. This is not a quirk of history, but rather a natural product of social development.
Soviet Union demonstrated the ability to solve large-scale problems, which amazed the imagination of his contemporaries. In a record short time, the USSR turned into a powerful industrial power, managed to defeat the main ground forces of Germany in World War II, overcome its lag behind the United States in creating atomic weapons, and be the first to start space exploration.
At the same time, in the process of its development, the USSR fully demonstrated the weaknesses that are organically inherent in any totalitarian regime, which determined the inevitability of its collapse.
The collapse of the administrative command system. In a decision-making system without broad discussion, one leader or a group of leaders often misidentified priorities in the allocation of resources. Resources were spent on projects that did not yield returns, or even resulted in damage.
Both in the USSR and in the countries of Eastern Europe, a lot of "construction projects of the century" were carried out, the economic feasibility of which was doubtful, and the ecological disadvantage was indisputable. At the same time, no special attention was paid to the development of energy-saving and resource-saving technologies. For ideological reasons, a ban was imposed on research in the field of creating artificial intelligence, genetics, which led to a serious lag in these most important areas of scientific and technological progress. Based on ideological considerations, solidarity with the "anti-imperialist" regimes in 1957-1964. The USSR provided economic assistance to more than 20 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America... At its expense, up to 50% of Egypt's expenses for economic development were covered, up to 15% - for India. The willingness of N.S. Khrushchev's assistance to any regime that expressed interest in the ideals of socialism led to the waste of the USSR's resources, without bringing any significant economic or military-political benefit. Subsequently, most of the regimes that received assistance entered the orbit of influence of the developed countries of the West. Due to a purely volitional decision, taken even without discussion by the governing bodies of the ruling party and the state, the USSR by force of arms supported in 1979 a pro-Soviet-oriented group in the ruling elite of Afghanistan. This action was regarded by the people of Afghanistan, most of the developing countries as aggression. The USSR was embroiled in a senseless and hopeless war, costing great human and material losses, undermining its international authority.
The centralized, administrative-command management of the economy, as its scale grew, required the growth of the administrative apparatus, working with diminishing returns. One "center of power", in principle, is not able to monitor, control and plan, especially for several years in advance, all the connections between tens of thousands of large, small and medium-sized enterprises, changes in the conjuncture of world markets. This created anarchy in the economy, which only in words remained centrally planned. During the entire existence of the USSR, the tasks of the five-year plans were never fully completed (not to mention the "seven-year plan" of NS Khrushchev, the results of which were not summed up at all). In the 1980s. production growth rates became zero. The tasks formulated by the ruling party to transfer the economy to an intensive path of development, using technologies of the information age, were not fulfilled. One of the reasons for this was that the leaders of industries, regions, enterprises were afraid of the emergence of mass unemployment, were not ready to solve the social problems of modernization.
The crisis of ideology. Providing massive support for itself with the help of ideology, the totalitarian regime had to constantly demonstrate success, confirm the realism of the formulated super-tasks, otherwise enthusiasm gives way to disappointment and irritation.
The leaders of the USSR and other countries, which proclaimed themselves to have reached the lowest phase of communism, were bound by the obligation to build the most progressive and just society in the world, where the needs of people (of course, reasonable ones) would be fully satisfied. Thus, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, put forward the slogan - "Five years of hard work, ten thousand years of a happy life." In the Program of the CPSU, adopted under N.S. Khrushchev, contained a commitment to achieve communism during the lifetime of the generation of Soviet people of his day, by 1980 to surpass the most developed country in the world - the United States in terms of basic development indicators.
The ideologists of the CPSU and other ruling related parties offered various explanations for the reasons why the goals set turned out to be unattainable. However, these explanations, even when taken seriously, objectively weakened the foundations of totalitarian statehood. References to the intrigues of external and internal enemies strengthened the atmosphere of general suspicion in society, which was used for career purposes by self-serving factions of the bureaucratic elite, who cracked down on the most talented and creative part of the intelligentsia. Exposing the miscalculations, mistakes and crimes of the previous leaders, often being fair, discredited the totalitarian regime in general.
Criticizing leaders is common and common in a democracy. In the USSR, after praising the wise and infallible leaders I.V. Stalin, N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhnev, one turned out to be guilty of genocide, the extermination of millions of his own fellow citizens, the other in voluntarism, unwillingness to reckon with objective realities, the third in stagnation, inertia. Since the totalitarian regime is based on the deification of the leaders, their debunking or obvious physical weakness (Yu.V. Andropov, K.U. Chernenko) acted as a source of falling confidence in him. Lying about supposed successes played a large role in ensuring the stability of the regime, but with the development of the media and their globalization, thanks to international broadcasting, satellite television, it became more difficult to hide the truth.
Over time, the enthusiasm of the masses inevitably gave way to apathy, irony, the desire to find alternative ways of development, in the 1980s. embracing the leadership of the CPSU, CPC, and other ruling parties.
Disappointment in ideology befell not only the ruled, but also many parts of the administrative apparatus. Only at the origins of the communist movement were leaders who were sincerely convinced of the correctness of their ideas, able to convey their convictions to others. For many representatives of the hierarchical, bureaucratic management mechanism, ideology has become not so much a symbol of faith as a tribute to ritual, a means of covering up personal interests, including in the sphere of enrichment.
According to a number of theorists - from a former associate of V.I. Lenina L.D. Trotsky to M. Djilas, a Yugoslav Marxist branded in the USSR as a renegade, a totalitarian regime, even if it was originally built on the ideas of social egalitarianism, inevitably gives rise to a new ruling class - the bureaucratic elite, the nomenclature. Over time, its desire to legalize the accumulated wealth creates a layer in the leadership of the totalitarian regime for which the socialist idea becomes a burden. In the regions, in the localities, a layer of the oligarchy is being formed, for which control over its activities by the center of power proves to be an obstacle to enrichment, which becomes a source of separatist tendencies.
Isolation in the international arena. The Soviet totalitarian regime, due to its inherent distrust of the policies of countries dominated by a different ideology, aspirations for complete control over all spheres of society, treated with great apprehension international cooperation... Opportunities to take advantage of international division labor, scientific, technical and humanitarian cooperation were deliberately limited. The desire for self-isolation was fueled by the policy of restrictions on trade carried out by Western countries during the Cold War, which was also a factor in the loss of the pace of development.
Initially, when the communists came to power in the countries of Eastern Europe, each of them, following the Soviet model, began to carry out industrialization, striving to move to complete self-sufficiency. With the creation in 1949 of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance between the USSR and Eastern European countries, a system of international division of labor was formed, but the pace of its development was inferior to those of Western Europe.
The establishment of direct ties between enterprises, the formation of international firms in conditions when integration was carried out within the framework and on the basis of interstate agreements, required countless approvals and practically did not receive development. Planning for the development of foreign trade relations with the establishment of fixed prices for a five-year period led to a gap between prices within the CMEA from global ones. Thus, with the rise in world prices for energy resources after 1973, the USSR continued to supply them to its partners at the same, lowered prices to the detriment of its interests. But in the 1980s. the prices of Soviet oil and gas turned out to be higher than the world average. This has already become a source of economic hardship in the countries of Eastern Europe.
The low efficiency of integration within the CMEA framework intensified the secret dissatisfaction of its participants with the existing model of relations. Aspirations grew, including those of the large country CMEA - USSR, to the development of trade economic ties with the highly developed countries of the West, the acquisition of high technologies they produce, consumer goods. The share of Western countries in the USSR's foreign trade turnover in just 20 years, from 1960 to 1980, doubled - from 15% to 33.6%. At the same time, finished products were mainly purchased, instead of establishing joint production, which is much more economically profitable. (One of the few exceptions was the creation of a Soviet-Italian automobile plant in Togliatti, which began producing Zhiguli cars.)
If the USSR had the opportunity through the sale of natural resources, oil, gas, which in the 1970s. became the main ones in its export, to conduct balanced trade with Western countries, then its CMEA partners very soon faced an increase in debt, inflation, undermining development prospects.
Difficulties in relations with countries that were previously ranked among the reliable allies of the USSR, the world of socialism, undermined confidence in the ideology professed by the CPSU. Claims that relations of a new type were developing between the countries building socialism looked unconvincing. The friction between the USSR and Yugoslavia, the conflict between the USSR and China, which escalated into clashes on the Soviet-Chinese border, the war between China and Vietnam in 1979, and dissatisfaction with the CMEA clearly showed that totalitarian socialism is very far from peacefulness.
BIOGRAPHIC APPENDIX
NS. Khrushchev(1894-1971) - successor to I.V. Stalin as First Secretary of the Central European Communist Party (1953-1964), at the same time Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1958-1964).
NS. Khrushchev was born in the village of Kalinovka, Kursk province, worked as a shepherd, mechanic in factories and mines in Donbass. In 1918 he joined the Bolshevik Party, took part in civil war... He graduated from the working faculty of the Donetsk Industrial Institute and began to move rather quickly along the steps of the party hierarchy: from the secretary of the party cell of the workers' faculty to the secretary of the party committee of the Industrial Academy (1929), then - the secretary of the district committee in Moscow, since 1934 - a member of the Central Committee of the party, the head of the Moscow city and regional party organizations. From 1938 to 1949 he was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, in 1949-1953. - Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
NS. Khrushchev was a typical promoter of the Stalinist era, a period when it was not education that was valued most of all, but workers 'and peasants' origins, a fanatical belief in the communist idea personified by the supreme leader. The lack of deep knowledge was compensated by the Stalinist nominees with self-confidence, the belief that, possessing an advanced ideology, they are able to solve problems of any complexity. Moving up the career ladder, especially in conditions of massive repression, constant search and exposure of "enemies of the people" required sophistication in intrigue and demagoguery.
The promotion of Khrushchev to the first role in the party in the context of the struggle for power that began after the death of I.V. Stalin, was a compromise between the leaders, much better known in the country (L. Beria, V. Molotov, G. Malenkov, etc.). They, however, underestimated Khrushchev's acumen and peasant ingenuity. The first to fall in 1954 was L. Beria, accused, in the spirit of the Stalinist trials, of crimes against the people and the party, including espionage, and sentenced to death penalty... In 1956, Khrushchev spoke at the 20th Congress of the CPSU with the exposure of the mass repressions of the Stalinist period, in the implementation of which the entire Stalinist guard, including Khrushchev himself, had a hand. It is difficult to say whether Khrushchev really suddenly realized the criminal nature of the repression, but their condemnation gave him strong arguments in the struggle to consolidate his power against the Stalinist guard. The attempt to oust Khrushchev, undertaken in 1957 by Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, ended in failure, its initiators were expelled from all posts, expelled from the party and sent to retirement.
Strictly speaking, the groundlessness of many repressions in 1938 was admitted by I.V. Stalin, who blamed their scale on N.I. Yezhov, although the repressions continued after that. Since the resumption of the "great terror" after the XX Congress of the CPSU did not follow, many of the repressed were previously rehabilitated, society became more open, the name of NS Khrushchev is often associated with the "thaw". Nevertheless, there is no reason to consider Khrushchev a supporter of liberal democracy. He was characterized by the same authoritarian decision-making style as Stalin, which, combined with impulsive character, incompetence in many issues, fanatical belief in the truth of the learned dogmas, caused great harm. Subsequently, when he was retired, Khrushchev said: “Deciding on the arrival of the“ thaw ”and consciously going to it, the leadership of the USSR, including myself, were at the same time afraid of it: as if because of it there would be a“ flood ”that would overwhelm us and which will be difficult for us to deal with<...>We were afraid of losing our previous opportunities to govern the country, restraining the growth of sentiments that were undesirable from the point of view of the leadership. Otherwise, a shaft would have gone that would have demolished everything in its path. They feared that the leadership would not be able to cope with its functions and direct the process of change in such a way that it would remain Soviet. We wanted to release the creative forces of people, but in such a way that new creations would contribute to the strengthening of socialism. " (Khrushchev N.S. Memories. Selected Fragments. M., 1997.S. 507.)
Among the most unsuccessful actions of Khrushchev, it is customary to include the transfer of the Crimean region to Ukraine in 1954, experiments with agriculture: directives on ubiquitous, without taking into account climatic conditions, the introduction of corn, an increase in the level of socialization of the personal economy of the peasantry, up to the ban on keeping livestock. A negative role was played by constant ineffective administrative reforms (the creation of economic councils, attempts to divide the party's structures into industrial and agricultural). Khrushchev could not resist attacks on the creative intelligentsia, attempts to teach artists what to write and how.
Foreign policy was also inconsistent. Under Khrushchev, relations with Yugoslavia improved at first, then relations with Yugoslavia began to flare up again, a conflict with China began to flare up, large resources were spent on helping the countries of Asia and Africa, which subsequently broke off relations with the USSR. Increased openness in foreign policy, readiness for personal communication with leaders foreign countries, the search for compromises was combined with adventurism, unpredictability, which put the world on the brink of nuclear war during the Caribbean crisis of 1962. Khrushchev's threats to "bury" America, produce missiles "like sausages" were perceived as proof of the impossibility of stable relations.
In 1964, the party and state elite nominated and supported by Khrushchev - Brezhnev, Podgorny, Shelest and others, taking advantage of the moment when the aging leader was resting in Crimea, decided to remove him from power. Being retired, in fact under house arrest, N.S. Khrushchev dictated memoirs, which, despite the limitations of his contacts, ended up abroad and were published.

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS
1. Expand the role of ideology in the conditions of totalitarian regimes. Was she the source of their strength or their weakness? Explain the answer.
2. What role does the leader's personality play in a totalitarian regime? Draw conclusions about the importance of miscalculations, mistakes of leaders for the development of their countries.
3. Show the examples of the USSR and other socialist states, in which the effectiveness and weakness of totalitarianism was manifested.
4. Compare the post-war integration processes in Western and Eastern Europe. How do you explain the reasons for the low efficiency of integration within the CMEA framework?
5. Make up short message he is with. Khrushchev. Assess the significance of his activities for the country. Was he a charismatic leader?

§ 40. USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE: EXPERIENCE OF A DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

Symptoms of the crisis of the Soviet model of totalitarian socialism manifested themselves primarily in the economy (zero growth, obsolescence and wear and tear of fixed assets, lagging behind Western countries in the development of new technologies, low living standards of the majority of the population, etc.).
It is for this reason that attempts to reform from above, which intensified with the election of Yu.V. Andropov for the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in 1983 and continued with the promotion of M.S. Gorbachev in 1985, began with the economic sphere.
From perestroika to a democratic revolution. The first transformations were carried out based on administrative command methods of management. Measures were taken to tighten labor discipline, introduce quality control of products, and improve society through an anti-alcohol campaign. The return on these measures turned out to be minimal, which created incentives to search for ways to more deeply reform the entire complex of social relations.
The purpose of perestroika was to release the resources for the development of society. In the international arena, this goal was served by the end of the cold war and deeper participation in the system of the international division of labor. In the sphere of economics, it was a question of expanding the independence of enterprises, introducing elements of market relations. This was supposed to increase interest in the introduction of new technologies, create incentives to increase labor productivity. The ideas of glasnost and democratization were put forward with the expectation that they would reveal the accumulated shortcomings, would allow, by awakening the initiative from below, to renew the composition of the political and economic leadership of the country.
It was about the evolutionary change of the form of the political regime, overcoming its features such as total control of power over all spheres of society, the introduction of elements of a real separation of powers, assistance in the formation of structures of civil society. If the concept of perestroika was fully implemented in the Soviet Union, most likely, a society with a mixed economy, strong mechanisms of social protection of the population, reminiscent of the Swedish model of socialism, capable of further modernization and mastering the technologies of the information age would have developed.
Processes similar to the restructuring unfolded in most of the countries of Eastern Europe. In some cases, the initiators were the leaders of the ruling parties themselves, fearing changes, but considering it their duty to follow the example of the CPSU. In others, as soon as it became clear that the Soviet Union did not intend to guarantee the inviolability of the ruling regimes in Eastern Europe by force of arms, advocates of reforms became more active, and opposition political parties and movements began to emerge.
The only Eastern European state where an attempt was made not to change anything was Romania. N. Ceausescu's personal power regime was swept away as a result of the popular uprising in 1989, and he himself was shot.
In most of the countries of Eastern Europe, the growing wave of mass protests in favor of democratization and market reforms, the actual legalization of the opposition, caused political crises. In the GDR, the crisis was aggravated by the flight of the population to West Germany through the opened borders of Hungary and Czechoslovakia with Austria. Not daring to resort to repression in conditions when the government of the senior partner in the blocs, the USSR, supported the ideas of democratization, most of the elderly leaders of the communist parties of Eastern European countries who shared the "Brezhnev doctrine" resigned. The new leaders, who had a reputation for advocating reforms, tried to establish a dialogue with the opposition, create political coalitions focused on reforms, and ensure a peaceful course of change. However, as a result of the first free elections after the Second World War, the communists were removed from power, which passed into the hands of the opposition.
Eastern Europe after socialism. The result of peaceful democratic revolutions was the refusal of the Eastern European countries to participate in the Warsaw Pact Organization, which ceased to exist. The structures of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were liquidated. Economic and political ties were reoriented towards the Euro-Atlantic states. In 1991, most of the Eastern European countries signed Association Agreements with the European Union. In 1994 they entered the Partnership for Peace program with NATO. Began to consider the issue of full membership of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic in this military-political bloc. The citizens of the GDR overwhelmingly supported the parties that advocated the restoration of German unity.
The course towards an accelerated transition to a market economy associated with the privatization of industry, the curtailment of unprofitable (by Western European standards) production, and savings on social programs has caused serious problems. There was a rise in inflation and unemployment, and a drop in living standards took place. This was largely due to the fact that the new leaders who came to power, who gained popularity as staunch supporters of freedom and democracy, had very schematic ideas about the market economy. This created the conditions for a certain shift to the left in the countries of Eastern Europe. It was not about a return to the Soviet model of socialism. Most of the former communist and workers' parties have changed leaders, revised their program guidelines. Without abandoning the ideals of social justice, they proposed models for their implementation that are compatible with a market economy, political pluralism, in other words, are close to social democratic ideas about socialism. This provided them by the end of the 1990s. electoral success. In Poland in 1995, the leftist candidate A. Kwasniewski won the presidential elections.
Much more difficult than in other Eastern European countries, the transformations were going on in Yugoslavia. This country after the conflict between I. V. Stalin and I. B. Tito was not included in Soviet system unions, however, the initially formed political regime in it had many signs of totalitarianism. The reforms carried out in Yugoslavia in the 1950s, which met with sharp criticism from N.S. Khrushchev and once again causing an exacerbation of her relations with the USSR, were not associated with a radical change in the nature of the regime. They were aimed at introducing a model of self-government in production, developing elements of a market economy, and allowed a greater degree of ideological freedom than in neighboring Eastern European countries. At the same time, the monopoly on the power of one party, the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, and the special role of the leader (I.B. Tito) remained.
Since the political regime that existed in Yugoslavia was a product of its own development, did not rely on the support of the USSR, the force of the example of perestroika and democratization affected Yugoslavia with the death of Tito to a lesser extent than in other Eastern European countries. Yugoslavia faced a different problem, namely interethnic and interreligious conflict, which led to internal armed conflicts, the disintegration of the country.
The crisis in the USSR: causes and consequences. Differences in the pace and direction of transformations in the interests of the ruling elites of various union republics contributed to the disintegration of such a multinational state as the USSR.
Initially, the concept of perestroika was based on internal contradictions. Under the conditions of a totalitarian system of organizing power, it could only be initiated from above and carried out using administrative command levers. Perestroika implied their gradual dismantling, replacing them with new institutions of power operating on democratic principles. However, at least two problems arose that the initiators of perestroika were not ready to solve. The old management mechanisms lost their ability to function effectively before the new institutions of power took shape. The new social and political forces and movements that emerged due to perestroika partially rejected and partially revised its goals.
The initiators of perestroika did not take into account that, despite a significant loss of confidence in the CPSU as the ruling party, its ideology, most of the party functionaries are accustomed to unlimited power. A large layer of the party-state elite was not satisfied with the ideological pluralism that reigned in society, considering it a spiritual vacuum, and wanted to fill it with a new higher idea. Discontent was caused by the desire of M.S. Gorbachev to normalize relations with Western countries, his readiness to recognize the legitimacy of changes in Eastern Europe. Democracy of M.S. Gorbachev was encouraged to perceive him as a weak leader. Public opinion increasingly endowed B.N. Yeltsin (since May 1990 - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR), who took a position in opposition to the CPSU and the union authorities.
Spiritual vacuum in union republics began to be filled with ideas of nationalism, popularity, as in Russia, began to acquire those leaders who demonstrated their independence from the union center of power. In 1988, the contradictions between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated, resulting in a war for control over Nagorno-Karabakh. In the 1989-1990s. in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the desire to secede from the USSR prevailed. The communist parties that ruled them broke ties with the CPSU and began to flirt with the popular fronts that had arisen. Hotbeds of tension arose in interethnic relations in Moldova, South Ossetia, Georgia, the withdrawal of which was announced by Abkhazia. Ethnic cleansing began, the displacement of the Russian population from the national regions.
Attempts by the union center of power to solve the problems that arose through dialogue, compromises, limited forceful actions, and the advancement of ideas for the renewal of the Union, as a rule, were delayed or rejected by local leaders. The referendum held in March 1991 showed that the majority of the citizens of the USSR are in favor of keeping it in an updated form. At the same time, the referendums held in the union republics showed the opposite.
Since 1988, agricultural production began to decline, since 1990 - industrial production, inflation reached 10%. Manifestations of economic initiative often contributed to the collapse of production. Most executives are used to tight control over their actions. The weakening of control from above either caused confusion or was used for personal gain.
In the spring and summer of 1991, the worsening economic situation caused the growth of the strike movement, and internal contradictions in Russia itself intensified. Political groupings that emerged among the intelligentsia, youth, leaders who broke with the CPSU, considered it necessary to develop more dynamic perestroika processes. Part of the administrative-command elite, the military elite considered the only way out to establish an authoritarian regime and restore the previous system of government. M.S. Gorbachev, who became President of the USSR in March 1990, tried to find a compromise line through political maneuvers. Despite this, the clashes between the left and the right, the center and the republics continued. His policies have been increasingly criticized as inconsistent and not solving a single problem. The President of the USSR did not enjoy support even in the CPSU, which he continued to lead.
The CPSU no longer existed as a political party, only nominally it had millions of members. In reality, in 1991 only the party nomenklatura existed, having lost public support, the orthodox, conservative faction of which in August 1991 attempted to remove M.S. Gorbachev from power and the establishment of an authoritarian regime.
The bulk of the population of the USSR took a wait-and-see attitude. The sharp condemnation of the coup by the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin and the appearance in Moscow of several thousand supporters of democratic reforms, M.S. Gorbachev voluntarily hand over power to them caused confusion among the conspirators, forced them to surrender.
The conspiracy and its failure discredited not only the CPSU, whose activities on the territory of Russia were banned by B.N. Yeltsin, but also the allied power structures. The ruling elite of the republics that were part of the USSR finally lost confidence in them. In August, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia announced their secession from the USSR, which was recognized by M.S. Gorbachev, who remains the president of a de facto non-existent state. Real power, including in Russia, passed to the governments and Supreme Soviets of the republics that were part of the USSR. The attempts of the former union center, which had lost its influence on the situation, to reform the USSR and create a new state entity in its place - the Union of Sovereign States (UIT) - met with extremely limited support. The new leaders of Russia reacted coolly to this idea. The aspiration of the largest, after Russia, republic - the Ukrainian one - for independence made the idea of the SSG dubious. The main thing was that both the ruling elites of the former Soviet republics and their population, realizing the need to maintain close relationships, no longer trusted the central bureaucracy.
BIOGRAPHIC APPENDIX
M.S. Gorbachev(b. in 1931) - the last leader of the CPSU, the first and last President of the USSR.
M.S. Gorbachev was born in the village of Privolnaya, Stavropol Territory. While studying at school, he worked as an assistant to a combine operator, at the age of 18 he received the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, joined the party. In 1950 he entered the law faculty of Moscow State University, then graduated from an agricultural institute in absentia. The scientific career to which his wife, Raisa Maksimovna, M.S. Gorbachev preferred social and political activity in the Komsomol and in 1960 became the first secretary of the regional committee of the Komsomol.
For further successful advancement, Gorbachev had all the data: peasant origin, two higher educations, organizational skills shown in Komsomol work, the ability to get along with people, a respectful attitude towards senior party comrades. In a relatively short time, he became the first secretary of the Stavropol city committee of the Komsomol, and then the head of the party organization of the region. In 1978, a well-established regional leader, personally known to the top leaders of the party who came to rest at the resorts of the region, was transferred to Moscow, to the central apparatus of the party, where M.S. Gorbachev is engaged in agrarian policy. As part of the leadership of the CPSU, whose average age was approaching 70 years, Gorbachev looked like a black sheep, but it was this circumstance that opened up the prospect of being promoted to the first roles. After the death of Yu.V. Andropov in 1984, and in 1985 K.U. Chernenko M.S. Gorbachev holds the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
In the national history of M.S. Gorbachev was given the difficult and thankless role of a reformer. High-ranking party leaders who had gone through all career stages in 1960-1970 were aware of the falsity of official propaganda about successes in building a new society; they knew that the USSR was lagging behind Western countries in many indicators of development. Nor was it a secret for them that behind the rhetoric about socialist values lies careerism, lack of principle, the struggle for power, corruption, and the waste of resources. However, firstly, in the system of strict subordination in the power vertical, it was possible to survive only by accepting the established rules of the game, which required duplicity, which became second nature. Second, the nature of education, the system of monitoring political reliability, the strength of habit and the inertia of thinking excluded the way up to people who doubted the basic principles of organizing the life of society. Accordingly, the reforms, the need for which were recognized by both Khrushchev and Andropov, were associated by them with the improvement of socialism, with the return to the ideals described by K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin. At the same time, it was not taken into account that this ideal never existed anywhere and never in life. Attempts to rebuild reality in accordance with the ideal boiled down to appeals, new slogans, measures to tighten discipline and law and order, the implementation of which was entrusted to inert officials or corrupt bureaucrats.
The first steps of M.S. Gorbachev's path of reforms was consistent with the measures of his predecessors: calls for accelerated development, the introduction of product quality control, an administrative campaign to combat alcoholism, which did not produce any noticeable results.
The main result of M.S. Gorbachev was that he managed to take the reforms beyond the framework of partial, cosmetic measures that could only prolong the agony of the old system. Publicity, the discovery in the press of truthful facts about the past, about the outside world, the disintegration of power structures in the USSR, the emergence of the possibility of legal or semi-legal opposition activities, an emphasis on humanistic values, the deprivation of party structures of the levers of economic power have changed society. There was no rejection of the socialist ideal, but its understanding came close to the real model of equality created by the social democracy of Europe.
The main miscalculation of M.S. Gorbachev was in the loss of the pace of transformation, when society approached the line where decisive, in fact, revolutionary methods of renewal were required. political system, economic relations. Caution, restraint in setting goals, concessions to the conservative wing of the party were justified and necessary at the initial stage of reforms. They made it possible to partially neutralize resistance to transformations, to avoid a split in society. However, the experience of the apparatus work, bureaucratic intrigue, the ability to substantiate and justify one's actions among the party and Komsomol activists could no longer help when events began to develop with greater dynamics.
The result was the loss of initiative in raising the issue of reforming the Union, in carrying out economic reform. The moment was missed when the interests of transformations demanded a decisive break with the conservative wing in the CPSU and its radical modernization. Created for the first time as a result of elections and meeting the criteria of democracy, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1990 elected M.S. Gorbachev as president of the USSR, which gave him a new lever of power. However, no reform of the ruling party took place. The concept of reform was outlined at the last, XXVIII, Congress of the CPSU, but its implementation was belated. M.S. Gorbachev and his inner circle found themselves in political isolation.
Supporters of reforms in the CPSU and outside the ranks, who initially saw Gorbachev as their leader, began to criticize his course as inconsistent, inhibiting reforms, and left the party. Reproaches of indecision, demands to take a tougher position expressed obvious and, what was more dangerous, secret opponents of the reforms. Nominated by Gorbachev to the highest posts in the party and the state as compromise figures, in August 1991 they made an attempt to remove him from power. However, a repetition of the scenario that led to the fall of N.S. Khrushchev did not succeed, because the society became different. There were no longer those millions of obedient rank-and-file members of the CPSU who were ready to support any decision coming from above. The passivity of the majority of the population, the active actions of the defenders of democracy in Moscow, whose leader was B.N. Yeltsin, led to the collapse of the conspiracy.
The possibility of such a situation was due to the reforms initiated by M.S. Gorbachev. But at the same time, despite the personal courage shown by M.S. Gorbachev, who, being isolated, rejected the demands of the putschists to recognize the legality of the state of emergency, the real political initiative and, in fact, power was lost to him. The main levers of influence in the union republics were in the hands of local political elites, in Moscow - of the authorities of the RSFSR, supporters of radical transformations that achieved the dissolution of the CPSU. The liquidation of the USSR forced M.S. Gorbachev to end his duties as president.
Without denying the seriousness of the mistakes made during perestroika, one must nevertheless take into account that most of the problems that arose after the collapse of the USSR were generated by the actions of M.S. Gorbachev. The positive, creative part of his program did not have time to find embodiment. His main merit - the peaceful, non-violent dismantling of a dead end, incapable of either development or renewal of the totalitarian, command and control system of power and control, the end of the "cold war" dangerous for the whole world is widely recognized in the world community.

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS
1. Explain the reasons and goals of what was started in the 1980s. reforming the USSR from above. What was the essence of the concept of perestroika?
2. Identify the general and specific in the causes and methods of implementing democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and the USSR.
3. Expand the main problems in the implementation of reforms in the USSR.
4. Make a chronological table "The main stages of the reform process in the USSR."
5. Prepare the message “M.S. Gorbachev is the first and last president of the USSR ”. Highlight the role of M.S. Gorbachev in democratic reforms in the country, in establishing contacts with the outside world.
6. What are the main reasons for the collapse of the USSR. Which of them do you consider the most important?

§ 41. RUSSIAN FEDERATION: SEARCHING THE WAY OF DEVELOPMENT

The crisis situation in the USSR, not finding a solution, could lead to unpredictable consequences. A way out was found in the signing on December 8, 1991 in the city of Belovezhsk of an agreement between the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in which the USSR was defined as a former, that is, a non-existent state. This move, the legality of which many lawyers consider controversial, has received support from the rest of the former Soviet republics. Their leaders, at a meeting in Alma-Ata on December 21, signed a declaration on the termination of the existence of the USSR and joining the CIS. The aspirations of the ruling elites of the former Soviet republics to liberate the union center from power were satisfied, at the same time, the possibility of subsequent rapprochement remained, subject to the appropriate conditions.
Problems of Russia's transition to market economy. The Russian Federation as a new, sovereign state faced the problem of defining development priorities and its role in the world. Russia inherited from the USSR the status of a great nuclear power, about 60% of its economic potential, most of the territory rich natural resources, a developed system of foreign economic relations. At the same time, the legacy also inherited serious problems, such as debt obligations of the USSR, depreciation of industrial fixed assets (about 70%), the need to maintain a huge Soviet Army, declared but actually not started reforms of the crumbling economy.
As in Eastern Europe, most of the managerial staff did not have experience of working in a market economy, they came up with illusory ideas about it. The Western European experience in overcoming crises was not used; recipes for the neoconservative structural restructuring of the economy that were carried out in the Euro-Atlantic countries in the 1980s were taken into service. in completely different conditions and with different goals than in Russia.
The government headed by E.T. Gaidar, focused on methods of shock therapy to improve the economy. It was assumed that its transfer to the rails of a market economy, privatization would lead to the formation of a layer of owners interested in the prosperity of their enterprises, and free competition, including with foreign producers, would create incentives for accelerated modernization. However, this did not happen. According to the UN, Russia's macroeconomic indicators have rapidly deteriorated in the context of reforms.

Table 5.
Macroeconomic indicators of Russia

Indicator / year
Real GNP production in% of the last year
Production industrial products v%
Agricultural production in%
Investment volume in%
External debt in billions of dollars

Liberal reformers were unable to overcome the influence of the ideas of Marxism; they attached great importance to the forms of ownership of capital and the means of production. Meanwhile, the experience of the XX century has shown that it can be anything (state, corporatized, private), the general principles of the functioning of the economic system are important.
The Bolsheviks in 1917, conducting a "cavalry attack on capital", believed that the formal socialization of enterprises would increase their productivity. At the same time, they did not take into account that it takes time to train qualified managers, create effective systems for accounting and control of resources, labor and consumption measures, planning necessary to manage the economy from a single center of power. It was not taken into account that the transformation of the state into an institution for managing socialized property would turn on the workers' discontent with the low level of wages, which would require the creation of both a mechanism of repression and overdeveloped systems of social protection.
The transition from a planned to a market economy was associated not with less, but with great difficulties. This was warned, in particular, by K. Kautsky, who was convinced of the inevitability of the collapse of the USSR. In 1930, he wrote: “After the collapse of the Soviet state, the task of maintaining the uninterrupted flow of production will face its successors with the greater urgency, the more miserable, as can be foreseen, the economic situation in which they find the country. It is just as dangerous to transform nationalized enterprises into capitalist enterprises at one blow as it is vice versa - capitalist into nationalized ones. It is not only possible, but certainly should be allowed to the nationalized enterprises to continue to work on the same grounds.<...>Having come to power in Russia, democracy will have before itself a completely impoverished country. It can, of course, give this country an opportunity for rapid economic growth, but only if it avoids any waste, will concentrate all its resources on the development of productive forces. "
K. Kautsky's warning was well founded. Forced market reforms in Russia were doomed to failure for the following reasons.
First, a market economy cannot exist without a clear system of legal norms governing property relations, mutual obligations of producers and consumers, and the taxation procedure that have evolved in capitalist countries for centuries. Since the majority of the then supreme legislative body of power, the Supreme Soviet of Russia, had a negative attitude to the government's concept of reforms, it was not necessary to count on the approval of the legal basis of a market economy. The simultaneous existence of various legal norms, the vagueness of legislation, limiting the possibilities for the development of normal entrepreneurial activity, created a situation of chaos in the economy, favorable for its criminalization. Promising to reduce the role of the state in the economy, to bring it into line with the doctrine of liberal democracy, the government objectively increased the influence of the bureaucratic apparatus. The vagueness and inconsistency of the legal framework for private entrepreneurship, the decline of privatized enterprises led to the fact that the bureaucracy was able to solve many vital problems for the nascent layer of Russian businessmen at its own discretion. Thus, conditions were created for the growth of corruption, undermining the legal foundations of the functioning of government institutions.
Secondly, the market economy cannot function normally in the presence of an unstable exchange rate, high inflation rates (depreciation of the money supply). Meanwhile, the government decided to liberalize prices in the context of a continuing commodity deficit. As a result, the balance between supply and demand was established spontaneously, due to a reduction in consumption. In less than a year, prices have risen 100-150 times, while the corresponding compensation in wages lagged behind. The standard of living of the bulk of the population fell sharply. The government of E.T. Gaidar was unable to control the ruble exchange rate, which was rapidly falling against foreign currencies. In principle, this was impossible as long as the ruble served not only Russia, but also other sovereign states of the CIS. Correction of the reform policy undertaken with the appointment of the head of government B.C. Chernomyrdin in December 1992, could not give a quick return. Only in the summer of 1993, Russia carried out a monetary reform and introduced its own currency, which made it possible to reduce the rate of inflation.
Third, the modernization of the domestic industry so that it could produce competitive products required large investments that could not give a quick return. Meanwhile, the government showed no interest in supporting domestic producers, which required protectionist measures and tax breaks for modernizing enterprises. The liberalization of foreign trade made it possible to partially solve the problem of the commodity deficit through imports, but this had its own costs. The cost of growing imports was covered by the export of oil and gas, by external and internal loans. As a result, the country sold non-renewable natural resources, the external debt grew, while the domestic industry continued to decline. This decline, along with a reduction in the income of the bulk of the population, reduced budget revenues, prompted the government to increase taxes, which made production obviously unprofitable and unprofitable.
To cover the debts to public sector employees, the government used funds received from international credit institutions and the International Monetary Fund for current payments, which were provided for the modernization of industry. Due to the misuse of loans, foreign debt grew, the amount of interest on which by the end of the 1990s. began to approach the total amount of expenditure items of the budget.
An attempt by S.V. Kiriyenko, who existed for only a few months, to find a way out of the impasse by freezing the payment of interest on debts, their restructuring, led to another outbreak of inflation, an economic and political crisis in the fall of 1998.
Originally created by the government, E.T. Gaidar, the conditions of economic development contributed to the concentration of significant funds in the hands of a narrow circle of the new financial elite. The movement of these funds was subject to the logic of the interests of capital, which reflected the realities prevailing in Russia. So, with high inflation, any investment quickly depreciates, which gave rise to the desire to transfer free capital into foreign currency and export it outside the country. With a high level of taxes on manufacturers, it was much faster and easier than in production, it was possible to make a profit through operations in trade, financial speculation, resale of real estate, investments abroad. According to available data, the volume of capital exported from the country far exceeded the amount of foreign debt.
Political development of the Russian Federation. Both the emerging domestic and foreign capital were repelled from investments in the Russian economy by social and political instability. The decline in the standard of living of the majority of the population, the dismantling of social protection systems that began, increased social tension in society.
After privatization, the redistribution of power between the center and the subjects of the federation, a significant share of the blame for non-payment of wages and the emergence of unemployment was borne by new owners or local authorities. However, most of the claims Russian citizens, accustomed to the fact that all issues are resolved in Moscow, addressed the central government, the federal government apparatus.
The emerging and intensifying opposition to the course of reforms due to the growth of economic difficulties, the fall in the standard of living of the population in the supreme legislative body of Russia - the Supreme Soviet, led in 1993 to a constitutional conflict. The referendum in April 1993 showed that the majority of its participants were against early elections for both the president and the Supreme Soviet. Nevertheless, the escalating conflict between them became the cause of an armed clash in Moscow in October 1993, which ended in a victory for the President's supporters.
The new constitution, approved by a referendum, turned Russia into a presidential republic. However, starting with the first elections to the State Duma (the lower chamber of the highest legislative body of power - the Federal Assembly), a tendency of opposition between the legislative and executive branches of government has again emerged. It's not just about political and ideological differences. In Russia, they adopted the thesis that the separation of powers is a sign of democracy, but it was not taken into account that the condition for the normal development of the state, especially during the period of deep reform, is their interaction.
Conservation problems have become more acute territorial integrity Russia. Conflicts between the legislative and executive branches of government deprived the Russian "center" of trust in the eyes of the regions. The conflict of interests in the distribution of tax revenues to the federal budget and the budgets of the constituent entities of the Federation, the weakening of internal Russian economic ties are in many respects similar to the situation that preceded the collapse of the USSR. The constituent entities of the Federation with abundant natural resources, whose leaders believe that, acting independently of the federal authorities, they are more likely to provide a favorable treatment for attracting investments, achieve internal stability, and begin to show tendencies towards separatism. They are especially strong in some of the national subjects of the Federation. At the same time, as the crisis in Chechnya, which has unilaterally proclaimed itself an independent Republic of Ichkeria, has shown, forceful methods of solving those problems for the aggravation of which there are objective reasons are ineffective. The strong-willed decision of the federal authorities to send troops into Chechnya in 1994 led to an internecine war in which tens of thousands of people died. Its result was the aggravation of interethnic relations in the entire North Caucasus, political friction in Russia. Only in 1997 were federal troops withdrawn from Chechnya, and the search for a compromise, political settlement of contradictions began.
The new government headed by E.M. Primakov in the fall of 1998, inherited extremely complex problems. According to some estimates, the damage caused to Russia by unsuccessful reforms is comparable to the losses from the Great Patriotic War. Objectively, the Russian economy is in a worse position than before the start of the reforms; its lag behind the highly developed countries has increased. The resources required for modernization are largely exhausted. The ideas of democracy and the transition to a socially oriented market economy have been largely compromised.
Russia in the CIS. Many problems of Russia's development were in one way or another connected with its relations with other CIS countries. Initially, the prevailing expectation was that there would be no major difficulties in this area. There were hopes for the preservation of a single defense and economic space, which prompted the Russian leadership to act to the detriment of its own interests. The CIS partners were supplied with energy at reduced prices. Russia took upon itself the protection of their borders, delayed the introduction of its own national currency. The chance of introducing dual citizenship for the Russian-speaking population within the CIS was not used, which would provide Russia with the opportunity to protect its interests.
The hopes for rapprochement, however, have not materialized. Open borders and preferential terms of trade with the CIS countries, many of which have introduced their own customs regulations, created a channel for the semi-legal export of strategic raw materials from Russia. Disputes began over the division of property the former USSR: The Black Sea Fleet, its bases, the procedure for using the Baikonur cosmodrome, aspirations to create their own armed forces were manifested. Most of the former Soviet republics began to pursue policies that caused ethnic conflicts. There, the interests of the Russian-speaking population, which in most of them constituted from 20 to 40% of the population, were infringed upon. Russia was faced with the need to conduct peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former USSR (in Transnistria, Abkhazia, Tajikistan), to accept refugees from neighboring states, which laid an additional burden on its economy.
The pace and direction of reforms diverged, and significant differences arose between the CIS countries in terms of the degree of political democratization and the level of state control of the economy. Most importantly, economic interests turned out to be different. Although the statements of the leaders of the CIS countries emphasized their interest in strengthening the Commonwealth, several hundred agreements on deepening integration were concluded, most of them remained on paper. All CIS states, not excluding Russia, have shown interest in developing trade and economic ties outside the Commonwealth. Thus, by 1995, only 19% of Russia's exports went to the CIS, 15% to the countries of the former CMEA, the rest went to non-CIS states.
The reasons for the sluggish development of integration processes consisted, first of all, in the economic weakness of the largest CIS state - Russia, the orientation of its diplomacy towards the priority of relations with the developed states of the West. Only in 1994 were relations with the CIS countries recognized as a priority, which bore some fruit. However, in fact, the CIS began to turn into a community of "different distances": within the CIS, alliances of individual states began to form. Russia's closest ties are developing with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Special relations are developing between the Central Asian states of the CIS, which have many similar features in development. In fact, they have created their own union within the CIS. The Collective Security Treaty was signed by six of the eleven members of the CIS, and the CIS Charter was adopted by seven countries. With most of the CIS states, Russia builds ties on the basis of bilateral agreements; they are most developed with Belarus, with which an agreement on the formation of the Union was signed in 1997.
There is no doubt that for Russia, both from the point of view of economic interests and security considerations, relations with its closest CIS neighbors are of particular importance. However, the question of how they will develop was not finally resolved by the end of the 20th century.
BIOGRAPHIC APPENDIX
Boris Yeltsin, the first president of sovereign Russia, was born in 1931 in the village of Vutka, Sverdlovsk region. When the future president was six years old, his father took a job on a construction site in the town of Bereznyaki. The family lived in a barrack, a kind of commune, in extreme poverty. In the summer I had to earn money on a nearby collective farm.
After graduating from high school and the Ural Polytechnic Institute, where Yeltsin showed more interest in technical disciplines and sports than in social work, he began working as a civil engineer. In this work, B.N. Yeltsin fully displayed the qualities of an organizer, a leader, demanding of himself and others, capable of organizing people to solve large-scale problems. At 32, he is already the head of a large house-building plant. In 1968 he switched to party work and from 197G to 1985 headed the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU.
In 1985, with the beginning of perestroika, M.S. Gorbachev begins to renew the leadership of the party and state apparatus. The first secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional committee, who has a reputation as a demanding, tough leader, due to independence and straightforwardness, who did not enjoy special sympathy "at court" L.I. Brezhnev, invited to work in the central apparatus of the CPSU, where he soon took one of the key posts - the head of the Moscow Party organization.
Having accepted and supported the ideas of perestroika, glasnost, democratization, B.P. Yeltsin begins to implement them in Moscow. The fight against corruption, the privileges of the party-state elite, personnel cleansing in the power structures at the district level ensure Yeltsin popularity in public opinion, among the democratically-minded intelligentsia, but not among the conservative-minded party nomenclature.
The conflict between the conservatives and Yeltsin, becoming a symbol of radical sentiments in the party, was beneficial to M.S. Gorbachev. Demonstrating moderation, impartiality, reconciling opponents, he gradually deepened the perestroika processes. B.N. Yeltsin, however, was not satisfied with his role as a pocket extremist. In 1987, he demanded to be relieved of his posts, accused the leadership of the CPSU and personally Gorbachev of actually sabotaging perestroika. The answer was Yeltsin's "study", organized in the spirit of the courts of the Stalinist period, which showed that the party bureaucracy has not changed at all and, on command from above, is ready to organize the persecution of the unwanted. At the same time, M.S. It was unprofitable for Gorbachev to completely remove B.N. Yeltsin from political life, respectively, he offered him a relatively neutral post of head of the State Construction Committee. However, B.N. Yeltsin was not going to give up his independent political role. With the support of democratic forces, he managed, with a great advantage, not only to achieve election to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, but also to become its chairman. The anti-Yeltsin campaign in the mass media controlled by the CPSU only increased the authority of Yeltsin, who in 1990 announced his withdrawal from the ranks of the CPSU.
Attempts by B.N. Yeltsin, to promote the deepening of reforms and democracy in Russia, which received popular support (in 1991 in the democratic elections he became the first president of the Russian Federation), exacerbated his conflict with M.S. Gorbachev and allied power structures. The August 1991 putsch, in which Yeltsin and Russian democracy played a decisive role, ensured the transfer to them of real power, which was finally consolidated with the dissolution of the USSR.
B.N. Yeltsin as a strong leader inclined to radical, decisive actions, were in demand at the stage when the policy of M.S. Gorbachev began not to keep up with the course of events initiated by him. At the same time, B.N. Yeltsin is not doing a very good job.
Wanting, like most Russians, to see the results of the transformations as soon as possible, the Russian president supported the supporters of the most radical actions by inviting a group of young economists headed by E.T. Gaidar. However, the methods of transformation they used, the recipes for which were gleaned from the experience of countries with completely different conditions, theoretical works foreign economists have led to counterproductive results. The deterioration of the economic situation, the fall in the standard of living of the majority of the population caused a political conflict in society between the president and the Supreme Soviet.
The forceful resolution of the conflict and the establishment of a presidential republic in Russia strengthened the political prerequisites for reforms. However, the political will and the president's readiness for decisive action could not compensate for the weakness of the economic base of reforms, the absence of a well-thought-out reform strategy. The conditions of the struggle of various pressure groups and interests for influence on decision-making, conflicts between the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the center, between the branches of government created a situation in which the strengths of B.N. Yeltsin as a leader could not fully manifest themselves. This led to a decline in the president's popularity, an increase in the influence of forces opposing him.

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS
1. What is the CIS? When and how was this Commonwealth formed? Which countries are included in it?
2. Expand the main problems facing the Russian Federation as a new sovereign state.
3. Who and how carried out the course of reforms in the Russian Federation in the 1990s? What are the reasons for the main economic and political complications and difficulties.
4. How do you assess the prospects for the further development of the CIS?
5. Assess the significance of BN's activities. Yeltsin as a political leader, head of the Russian state.